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Blind quantum computing (BQC) allows a client to have a server carry out a quantum computation for them
such that the client’s input, output, and computation remain private. A desirable property for any BQC protocol is
verification, whereby the client can verify with high probability whether the server has followed the instructions of
the protocol or if there has been some deviation resulting in a corrupted output state. A verifiable BQC protocol can
be viewed as an interactive proof system leading to consequences for complexity theory. We previously proposed
[A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, in Proceedings of the 50th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, Atlanta, 2009 (IEEE, Piscataway, 2009), p. 517] a universal and unconditionally secure BQC
scheme where the client only needs to be able to prepare single qubits in separable states randomly chosen from a
finite set and send them to the server, who has the balance of the required quantum computational resources. In this
paper we extend that protocol with additional functionality allowing blind computational basis measurements,
which we use to construct another verifiable BQC protocol based on a different class of resource states. We
rigorously prove that the probability of failing to detect an incorrect output is exponentially small in a security
parameter, while resource overhead remains polynomial in this parameter. This resource state allows entangling
gates to be performed between arbitrary pairs of logical qubits with only constant overhead. This is a significant
improvement on the original scheme, which required that all computations to be performed must first be put into
a nearest-neighbor form, incurring linear overhead in the number of qubits. Such an improvement has important
consequences for efficiency and fault-tolerance thresholds.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.96.012303
I. INTRODUCTION
Scalable quantum computing has proven extremely difficult
to achieve, and when the technology to build large-scale
quantum computers does become available it is likely that
they will appear initially in small numbers at a handful of
centers. How will a user interface securely with such a quantum
computer? A solution to this problem is offered by blind
quantum computing, which enables a classical client (Alice)
with limited quantum technology to delegate a computation to
the quantum server(s) (Bob) in such a way that the privacy of
the computation is preserved [1–6].
Blind classical computing (the notion of computing with
encrypted data) was proposed by Feigenbaum [7] and then
extended by Abadi et al. in a client server setting [8]. They
showed that a randomized classical polynomial time client
can encrypt and delegate general instances of certain problems
in NP1 to a powerful but untrusted server. Remarkably, they
also proved that the decision of no NP-hard function can be
*Corresponding author: joe.fitzsimons@nus.edu.sg
Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Further
distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s)
and the published article’s title, journal citation, and DOI.
1A problem is in the class NP if one can verify its answers efficiently;
it is NP-hard if it is as hard as any problem in NP.
encrypted in this way if unconditional security is required,2
unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level.
The idea of computing known circuits on encrypted data, while
requiring the encryption and decryption procedures be inde-
pendent of the complexity of the function to be evaluated, was
introduced earlier by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzous in a
scenario restricted to computational security [9] shortly after
the invention of RSA [10]. The problem of creating such a
scheme, known as fully homomorphic encryption, remained
open for 30 years before being settled by Gentry [11],
leading to one of the most active areas of research in modern
cryptography [12].3
The first example of blind quantum computation was
proposed by Childs [1] based on the idea of encrypting input
qubits with a quantum one-time pad [19,20]. At each step, the
client sends the encrypted qubits to the server, which applies a
known quantum gate. Finally, the server returns the quantum
state for the client to decrypt with their key. Cycling through
a fixed set of universal gates ensures that the server learns
nothing about the circuit. The next quantum blind protocol
with the possibility of detecting a cheating server was proposed
by Arrighi and Salvail [2]. In their scheme, the client gives the
server multiple quantum inputs, most of which are decoys (not
2A cryptosystem is unconditionally (computationally) secure if it is
secure even when the adversary has unlimited (restricted) computing
power.
3While several attempts have been made in recent years to find
homomorphic encryption schemes that allow for the evaluation of
certain quantum operations [13–17], a quantum analog of fully
homomorphic encryption remains elusive [18].
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intended to be part of the desired computation), but rather are
used to detect the server’s deviation. This leads to a trade-off on
the server side between gaining information and not disturbing
the system and achieves cheat-sensitive security against
individual attacks for a set of classical functions called random
verifiable, where it is possible for the client to efficiently
generate random input-output pairs. Extending these results,
together with Broadbent, we presented a universal blind
quantum computing (UBQC) protocol [3] in the measurement-
based model [21,22], where the only requirement for the client
is a classical computing machine and a very weak quantum
instrument, a random single-qubit generator, a currently
available technology as we have demonstrated recently [23].
Aside from the cryptographic scenario, a scheme based on a
quantum authentication protocol4 was proposed by Aharonov
et al. [4], showing that any language in BQP has an interactive
proof system with a verifier accessing a constant-size quantum
computer. This work was complemented by a recent result
of Reichardt et al. on the command of quantum systems via
rigidity of CHSH games [5], leading to further work on device-
independent verifiable blind quantum computing [24,25].
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the
topic of blind quantum computing. This includes, for example,
the extension of measurement-based UBQC to various set-
tings [26–30], addressing key questions regarding the effect
of the noise [31,32], the creation of protocols to optimize
communications requirements [33–35], the development of
privacy amplification techniques, similar to those applicable
to quantum key distribution, to combat the adverse effect of
imperfect devices on blindness [36], experimental demonstra-
tions [23,37,38], and cryptographic applications [6,39].
A desirable property for any UBQC protocol is verifiability,
whereby the client has a mechanism to verify the correctness
of a delegated computation. The motivation for this stems from
the broad range of computations that can be performed on a
quantum computer. For problems that are in NP, the solution
can be efficiently verified, at least in principle, using a witness.
However, for other problems that can be efficiently computed
using quantum computation, such as quantum simulation [40],
a dishonest server cannot be detected in such a way. The
ability to compute with encrypted data, while hiding the
underlying function, has opened up alternative approaches
to the problem of verification [3–5]. The main contributions
of the present paper are to make rigorous the foundations
of measurement-based UBQC and to present a verification
protocol that we prove to be secure against the most general
adversarial behavior of the server. Using this protocol, the
client can verify with high probability whether Bob has
followed the instructions of the protocol and the output state
is indeed in the correct form or if there has been a deviation
resulting in an incorrect output state. The central idea is based
on the insertion of randomly prepared single qubits (called
traps), blindly isolated from the actual computation, which
can act as such a witness. Here, even the computation of the
test (measurement of the qubits) can be performed blindly by
an untrusted server as we have demonstrated recently [38].
4The parties aim to communicate messages over an untrusted
channel in such a way that the receiver can authenticate the sender.
The verification scheme we present here makes use of
similar elements as suggested in [3]: Trap computations are
used to detect errors and a fault-tolerant encoding of the
computation is used to amplify the detection rate. While the
proof sketch for the effectiveness of verification in the original
UBQC paper did not consider the most general adversary,
we prove that the modified scheme we present here detects
or corrects any possible deviation by the server, except with
probability that is exponentially suppressed. In order to do
so we introduce universal resource states beyond the original
brickwork state introduced in [3]. The first such family is
a simple modification of the brickwork state that allows for
the embedding of an arbitrary trap qubit, which leads to
an inverse polynomial probability of detecting a deviation
from the computation. In order to achieve a higher rate of
detection, we introduce a second resource state that overcomes
the locality limitations inherent in the brickwork state. This
allows for the inclusion of a polynomial number of trap qubits
and fault-tolerant implementation of the target computation
based on the topological scheme of Raussendorf et al. [41].
Together, these two features allow for the probability of
failing to detect or correct a deviation from the protocol to
be made exponentially small. In this work we deal only with
the stand-alone security definitions, as composable security
follows from recent follow-up work by Dunjko et al. [42].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Sections II and III summarize various required concepts from
measurement-based quantum computing and also the original
UBQC scheme presented in [3]. In order to construct our
verifiable UBQC protocol we first introduce the concept of
dummy qubits in Sec. IV, where we assume Alice now can
prepare a qubit randomly chosen not only in the equatorial
plain, as in the original UBQC scheme, but also from the
set {|0〉,|1〉}. The latter qubits are called dummy qubits as
they have no effect on the actual underlying computation.
However, they permit the blind construction of isolated trap
qubits in the state |+θ 〉 as explained in Sec. VI, where
the core concept of verification is introduced. In order to
deal with both universality and verification, in Sec. V we
introduce two resource states called the cylinder brickwork
and dotted-complete graph states. The use of this scheme
is expected to lead to substantially increased thresholds for
fault-tolerant computing in the blind setting. A threshold for
fault-tolerant blind computation in the absence of verification
based on this fault-tolerance scheme was previously calculated
as 4.3×10−3 by Morimae and Fujii [31]. As shown in Sec. VI,
introduction of a single blind isolated trap qubit leads to a
verifiable blind quantum computing protocol with security
polynomial in the total number of qubits. In order to boost
the security while maintaining universality a different scheme
has to be constructed. This is done in Sec. VII, where we
put together various constructions of the previous sections to
present the main result of this paper, a universal exponentially
secure verifiable blind quantum computing protocol.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) [21,22]
is a form of quantum information processing where the key
twin notions that distinguish quantum information processing
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from its classical counterpart, entanglement (creating nonlocal
correlations between quantum elements) and measurement
(observing a quantum system), are the explicit driving force of
computation. More precisely, a measurement-based computa-
tion consists of a phase in which a collection of qubits is set
up in a standard entangled state. Measurements are then made
on individual qubits and the outcomes of the measurements
may be used to determine further adaptive measurements.
Finally, again depending on measurement outcomes, local
adaptive unitary operators, called corrections, are applied to
some qubits; this allows the elimination of the indeterminacy
introduced by measurements. Conceptually MBQC separates
the quantum and classical aspects of computation; thus it
clarifies, in particular, the interplay between classical control
and the quantum evolution process. The UBQC protocol
explores this unique feature of MBQC as it has been proven
to be conceptually enlightening to reason about distributed
computing tasks using this approach [43]. We begin by
describing all the required elements for an MBQC protocol
and then move to the particular family of distributed MBQC
protocols for hiding various aspects of a given computation.
A. Single-party (undistributed) MBQC protocol
A formal language to describe in a compact way the
operations needed for the MBQC model was proposed in [22].
In this framework every MBQC algorithm (usually referred
to as an MBQC pattern) involves a sequence of operations
such as entangling gates, measurements, and feedforwarding
of outcome results to determine further measurement bases.
A measurement pattern, or simply a pattern, is defined by a
choice of a set of working qubits (V ), a subset of input qubits
(I ), another subset of output qubits (O), and a finite sequence
of commands acting on qubits in V . Therefore, we consider
patterns associated with the so-called open graphs.
Definition 1. An open graph is a triplet (G,I,O), whereG =
(V,E) is a undirected graph and I,O ⊆ V are respectively
called input and output vertices.
Following the terminology of [22], a single-party MBQC
protocol consists of three elements.
(i) A uniform family of open graph states {(Gn,m,In,On)}n
over m vertices is associated with individual qubits, where n
is the size of the input and output space of the underlying
computation. In this paper we deal only with those MBQC
protocols that implement a unitary operator over their input
space and hence the size of the output space is the same as the
input space, but this is not a restriction and we can extend this
treatment to any general completely positive trace preserving
map by padding the input and output spaces. Further, for
simplicity, we will assume that the input is always a pure state,
though again this treatment can be extended to the general case.
We usually assume that |I | = |O| = n, however sometimes n
is taken to be strictly larger than the dimension of the input and
output Hilbert space due to the existence of auxiliary input or
output qubits (as in later protocols that incorporate trap qubits).
In order to have uniform notation, for the latter case, we will
still use I (O) to be the set of all nonprepared (nonmeasured)
qubits where it is strictly larger than the class of all input
(output) qubits. By the term “uniform family” we simply mean
that for any protocol there exists a classical Turing machine
that for a given input of the size n describes the required
graph over m  n vertices. If the underlying geometry of the
graph is regular, for example, being one-dimensional lines,
two-dimensional regular lattices, or brickwork graphs (as we
describe later), then instead of referring to the Turing machine
to define the uniform family we simply use fixed parameters
such as the size of the line or lattice to specify the graphs.
For any fixed input size n the graph Gn,m describes the initial
quantum state of the protocol. Given an arbitrary state of the
input qubits corresponding to the input vertices of the graph,
one prepares m − n qubits in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉)
corresponding to all noninput qubits (I c) in the graph and
then apply CTRL-Z operator between qubits i and j , if the
corresponding vertices in Gn,m are connected. Note that since
the CTRL-Z gate is symmetric the direction of the edge is not
important and hence we are working with undirected graphs.
We will usually refer to the obtained quantum state based on the
graph Gn,m as the graph state Gn,m, unless a different notation
is more appropriate; also for simplicity we drop the indices.
(ii) A set of angles φi ∈ A, where A ⊆ [0, 2π ) for all
nonoutput qubits, describes a collection of single-qubit (X,Y )
measurements, that is, measurement in the bases 1√
2
(|0〉 ±
eiφi |1〉). For the specific class of MBQC protocols that we dis-
cuss in this paper we require the angles to specify a collection
of measurement bases such that individual measurements are
unbiased with respect to the initial state. This is an essential
ingredient for the blindness property that we define later.
Without loss of generality, we can fix the set from which
the angles are chosen to be A = {0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4}. We
will discuss later how this combination of angles and particular
families of graph states leads to approximate universality.
(iii) The last ingredient is the structure of the dependence
among the measurements. It is known that despite the
probabilistic nature of the measurements, an MBQC protocol
can implement a unitary computation over the input space
by introducing a causal structure over the measurements.
This is done by allowing any measurement on qubit i to be
dependent on the result of some (possibly none) previously
measured qubits. Let si ∈ {0,1} be the classical result of the
measurement at qubit i. There are two type of dependences,
called X and Z dependences. If a measurement at qubit i
is X or Z dependent on the sj where qubit j has already
been measured, then the actual angle of the measurement
of qubit i during the protocol run is (−1)sj φi or φi + sjπ ,
respectively. Naturally one needs a noncyclic structure to
be able to run such dependences and for an arbitrary graph
such construction (if it exists) is formalized by the notion
of the flow of the graph [44,45]. Intuitively, flow captures
the propagation of quantum information as the resource state
is measured, identifying the locations where measurement-
dependent corrections should be made (see Fig. 1). A flow is
defined by a function (f : Oc → I c) from the measured qubits
to noninput qubits and a partial order () over the vertices
of the graph such that i  f (i)∀i and i  j∀j ∈ NG(f (i)),
where NG(k) denotes the neighborhood of vertex k in G. This
last property enforces f to be one to one. Each qubit k is X
dependent on f −1(k) and Z dependent on all qubits l such that
k ∈ NG(f (l)). Note that if the dependence set is empty, that
is, there is no qubit q such that q = f −1(k) or q ∈ NG(f (l)),
012303-3
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FIG. 1. Open graph state with flow. The boxed vertices are the
output (nonmeasured) qubits and the circular vertices are the mea-
sured qubits. The flow function is represented as arrows (representing
the X dependence between measured qubits) and the partial order on
the vertices (measurement order) is given by the dotted partition sets.
One can see easily how the flow highlights the underlying circuit
implemented by the measurement pattern.
then we set the convention that the corresponding value of sq
is zero and hence we can use the same formulas [(−1)sj φi or
φi + sjπ ] to compute the dependent angles. For a given graph,
once the input and output qubits have been labeled, the flow,
if it exists, is uniquely determined.
The above describes only a nondistributed (single-party)
MBQC protocol, that is, a protocol where a party both prepares
the graph state and performs the sequence of the dependent
measurements according to the order given by the flow
(see [21,22] for more details on MBQC computation). One
can easily extend the above definition to the distributed setting
where different elements of the protocol are accessible and
known only to specific parties and through classical-quantum
communication the parties collaborate to perform a specific
computation. Consider a simple two-party example where
Alice has the information about the angles and Bob has the
information about the graph and hence he can calculate the
flow. Then they can collaborate to perform the corresponding
computation as follows. First Bob prepares the required graph
state and asks Alice to send him the classical information
about the angles of the measurement. Bob then computes the
dependence and performs the measurement and so forth. The
purpose of this paper is to describe a family of such distributed
protocols where, despite the communication, Alice can keep
the measurement angles hidden from Bob. We then show that,
for certain carefully chosen graph families, hiding these angles
is sufficient to hide the full underlying computation together
with the input and outputs.
B. Two-party (distributed) hiding protocols
We define a specific family of two-party (Alice and Bob)
MBQC protocols (which we term hiding protocols) that can be
shown to be “blind” in the sense that Alice can hide information
from Bob. For simplicity, instead of working with a family of
graphs representing the computation over an arbitrary size
input, we fix the input size to be n and we define by m  n
the total number of vertices in the graph and hence the total
number of qubits in the equivalent single-party protocol. Note
that if we desire to have an efficient protocol, then we restrict
the computation of the protocol to be of the polynomial
size by requiring that m = Poly(n). However, blindness is
independent of any complexity assumptions, so we do not,
in general, restrict the size of m.
The protocol will be interactive, having m − n steps if the
output is quantum or m steps if the output is classical, where at
each step a single qubit is measured. In practice, we can paral-
lelize the protocol toD steps, whereD is the depth of the partial
order of the flow of the graph [46,47]. This is due to the special
structure of the partial order of the qubits defined by the flow
function whereby all the qubits in the same class of the partial
order are independent of each other and hence can be measured
in parallel, i.e., at the same time. However, this parallelization
will make no difference to the concept of blindness that we
are concerned with, so we keep the simple convention that at
each step only one qubit is measured. Furthermore, we assume
for the case of classical output that all of the output qubits are
measured in the final step with a Pauli X measurement. Again,
this is simply a convention for the discussion in our paper and
in general the output qubits could be measured with any angles
and in different steps depending on the flow construction. Such
a convention does not affect universality, as the circuit being
implemented can simply be modified to replace measurements
in arbitrary bases with measurements in fixed bases preceded
by an appropriate local rotation.
We will denote by s a sequence of length m − n with value
in {0,1} describing the result of the nonoutput measurements
performed so far. In the case of classical output, where output
qubits are measured as the last n steps, s is a sequence of length
m. The value associated with a qubit that is not yet measured
is set to 0 and hence at the beginning of the protocol before
any measurement being performed we set s = 0,0, . . . ,0. We
will denote by si the prefix of length i of s and elements of
s are denoted by si . Whenever adding the values of si and sj
we define their sum modulo 2. All the qubits in the protocol
are enumerated in such a way that at position i all qubits with
label less than i are measured before measuring qubit i. Any
total ordering of the qubits consistent with partial ordering of
the flow will work and as a result the measurement at qubit i
will depend only on the string s<i .
We describe first a generic hiding protocol with quantum
input and output (Protocol 1) and one with classical input
and output (Protocol 2) and then formalize various derivatives
of them to obtain universal, blind, and verifiable protocols.
Protocol 2 is exactly the same as Protocol 1 except that the
steps for encoding input are removed and all the output qubits
are measured in the Pauli X basis. We retain the common
text between the protocols so that they can be understood
individually. Note that the reason we choose the measurement
of the output qubits to be in the Pauli X basis is purely
for simplicity of presentation so that the same evaluation
function C of the nonoutput measurements, in Protocol 1,
can be used for the output qubits. However, one could add a
separate evaluation function for the output qubit measurement
to perform Pauli Z measurement over them.
The outline of the main protocol is as follows. Alice
has in mind a unitary operator U that is implemented
with a measurement pattern on some graph state G with
its unique flow function f and measurement angles in
A = {0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4}. This pattern could have been
designed either directly within the MBQC framework or via
translation from a circuit construction. The pattern assigns a
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measurement angle φi to each qubit in G; however, during the
execution of the pattern, the actual measurement angle φ′i is
a modification of φi that depends on previous measurement
outcomes instructed by f in the following way [44,45]:
φ′i = (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ.
As said before, in a standard MBQC pattern all the noninput
qubits are prepared in the state |+〉 and all the input qubits
in the desired input state |I 〉. Considering such quantum
input allows for the possibility of Alice having additional
capabilities allowing her to produce arbitrary input states or
for the possibility that the input state is supplied on Alice’s
behalf by a third party.
In our protocols, in order to hide the information about the
angles some randomness has to be added to the preparation
and consequently the measurements have to be adjusted to
compensate for this initial randomness to obtain the correct
outcome. This randomization has three components: (i) a set
of random angles θ used to hide the true measurement anglesφ,
(ii) a set of random bits r used to hide measurement outcomes,
and (iii) a set of random bits x used, along with θ , to hide any
quantum input via a one-time pad.
Alice prepares all the noninput qubits in |+θi 〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 +
eiθi |1〉) for some randomly chosen θi ∈ A and also applies a
modified version of a full quantum one-time pad encryption
over the input qubits using random keys xi ∈ {0,1} and θi ∈ A
as
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxnn Zn(θn)|I 〉
before sending all qubits to Bob. After that, Bob entangles
qubits according to G. Note that this unavoidably reveals
upper bounds on the dimensions of the underlying quantum
computation, corresponding to the length of the input and
depth of the computation. The computation stage involves
interaction: For each qubit, Alice sends Bob a classical
message δi ∈ A to tell him in which basis [in the (X,Y ) plane]
he should measure the qubit. This angle is computed in such a
way as to correct for the one-time padding of the input qubits
and the random rotation of the noninput qubits as
δi = (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ + θi + riπ,
where the last term riπ , with a randomly chosen ri ∈ {0,1}, is
added to hide the correct classical outcome of the measurement
from Bob without affecting the overall computation (see the
correctness proof below). Bob then performs the measurement
and communicates the outcome bi to Alice. Alice’s choice of
angles in future rounds will depend on these values, hence
she will correct the obtained outcome by setting si := bi ⊕
ri . If Alice is computing a classical function, the protocol
finishes when all qubits are measured (Protocol 2), as the
classical outputs are encoded in the measurement outcomes
sent to Alice. If she is computing a quantum function, Bob
returns to her the final qubits (Protocol 1) and it is taken that
the quantum output is encoded in these qubits. Note that in
Protocol 2 we take the input to be |+〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+〉, an encoding
of the fixed classical input 0 · · · 0; any other arbitrary classical
input i1 · · · in is prepared by applying appropriate Z on the
corresponding qubit to create
|e〉 = Zi11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zinn (|+θ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn〉).
For classical input there is no need for a full one-time padding
of the input, hence no need for the xi random variables as θi
rotation completely hides the input. The above explanation is
the basis for the correctness of all of the protocols presented
in this paper.
Definition 2. A hiding protocol with quantum input is
correct if the quantum output state is U |I 〉 or if the classical
outputs are the result of Pauli X measurements on the state
U |I 〉, where U is the unitary operator corresponding to the
implementation of the measurement pattern of the hiding
protocol. Similarly, one could define correctness for protocols
with classical input.
Theorem 1 (correctness). Assume Alice and Bob follow the
steps of Protocols 1 and 2. Then the outcome is correct.
Proof. The correctness of these protocol follows from
the correctness of standard measurement-based quantum
computation [22], as we now show. We explicitly give a
proof only for the case of quantum input and output, as the
remaining cases have virtually identical proofs. The protocol
deviates in three ways from the standard implementation of the
desired measurement pattern defined by a graph state G with
measurement anglesφi : a randomZ(θi) rotation over all qubits,
a random Xxi rotation over the input qubits, and measuring
with angles δi . However, since CTRL-Z commutes with Z
rotations, Alice’s preparation does not change the underlying
graph state; only the phase of each qubit is locally changed and
it is as if Bob had done the Z rotation after the CTRL-Z. Let
φ′i be the adapted angles of the measurement φi according
to the flow structure of the desired measurement pattern
defined by G. Note that a measurement in the {|+φ′i 〉,|−φ′i 〉}
basis on a state |ψ〉 is the same as a measurement in the
{|+φ′i+θi 〉,|−φ′i+θi 〉} basis on Z(θi)|ψ〉. Also a measurement
in the {|+φ′i 〉,|−φ′i 〉} basis on a state |ψ〉 is the same as a
measurement in the {|+−φ′i 〉,|−−φ′i 〉} basis on X|ψ〉. Finally,
since δi = (−1)xi φ′i + θi + πri , if ri = 0, Bob’s measurement
has the same effect as Alice’s target measurement; if ri = 1,
all Alice needs to do is to flip the outcome. Therefore, all the
deviation from the actual implementation of the measurement
pattern are corrected and the quantum output is the desired
state corresponding to the action of the unitary operator
implemented by the graph state G over the input state. 
Note that, in practice, if Alice has the description of a
unitary V such that V (⊗i |+〉) = |I 〉, then trivially a hiding
protocol that blindly computes UV over the input states
⊗i |+〉 will prepare the desired output state of the form U |I 〉.
Therefore, for such a scenario Alice can follow the step of
Protocol 1 with classical input without having to prepare
the encoded state Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxnn Zn(θn)|I 〉 herself.
However, we have presented the full protocol for an arbitrary,
possibly unknown, quantum input state, since the general
scheme proved useful for dealing with input supplied by a
third party [39].
III. BLINDNESS
We say a hiding protocol is blind if Bob cannot tell anything
relating to the angles of measurements. In considering this it
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is worth noting that Bob can run the protocol only once with
fixed values for Alice’s parameters φi , θi , ri , and xi . Later we
will show how for generic graphs this will lead to hiding the
output of the computation as well. Following the convention
of [8], we use the notation of a leakage function, denoted by
L(X), to formalize what Bob learns during the interaction. We
present a stand-alone security definition that is equivalent to
the original definition of blindness provided in [3].
Definition 3. A hiding protocol P with inputX is blind while
leaking at most L(X) if the distribution of messages obtained
by Bob in P is dependent only on L(X).
Theorem 2 (blindness). Protocol 1 is blind while leaking at
most G and n and Protocol 2 is blind while leaking at most G.
Proof. We first give a proof for the blindness of Protocol
1. We show that given G and n and independent of the
actions of Bob, the message registers he receives are always
in a maximally mixed state. We begin by introducing a new
variable θ ′i = θi + riπ for all i. Thus, any quantum input
received by Bob during a run of the protocol is given by |e〉 =
X
x1
1 Z
r1
1 Z1(θ ′1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxnn Zrnn Zn(θ ′n)|I 〉, while the remaining
qubits he receives are in states |+θ ′i+riπ 〉 for n < i  m.
Expressed in terms of θ ′i , δi becomes independent of ri for
all i, since
δi = (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ + θ ′i .
Thus, only the ith qubit received by Bob is dependent on
ri and so tracing over the secret values r simply dephases
every qubit in the computational basis. Similarly, only qubit
i is dependent on xi for 1  i  n and so tracing over x
completes the depolarization of the quantum input. Thus every
qubit received by Bob is in the maximally mixed state and
uncorrelated with all other qubits.
Next consider the classical communication used to convey
measurement angles during the protocol. The computation of
δi is composed of three terms. The first two terms (−1)sf−1(i)φi
and
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j )) sjπ may depend implicitly on bk and δk for
k < i, and on r and x. However, note that the communication
received up to step i is independent of θ ′i , the third term of δi .
Since θ ′i is uniformly random overA, δi must also be uniformly
random and uncorrelated with previous communication sent
to Bob. Thus, all communication in the protocol is uniformly
random and uncorrelated, once the random keys (x, r , and
θ ) are traced out, independent of the actions of Bob. An
identical argument holds for Protocol 2, except that all
m qubits are assigned measurements, and hence n is not
revealed. 
We note that the above definition is equivalent to a
simulator-based definition, since once L(X) is fixed, the
distribution of messages Bob receives is also fixed. Hence,
Alice could be replaced by a simulator with access only to
L(X) and this substitution could not be detected by Bob. A
more detailed treatment of simulator-based definitions and
composable security can be found in [42].
IV. DUMMY QUBITS
In order to obtain an intuitive method for achieving
verification, we construct an extension of Protocol 1 where
Alice can also prepare qubits in the state |z〉 where z is chosen
uniformly at random from {0,1}. These qubits are called
dummy qubits, as they will not be part of actual computation.
A dummy qubit remains disentangled from the rest of the
qubits of the graph state and, as we prove later, the addition
of these dummy qubits does not affect the correctness or
blindness of the hiding protocol. These dummy qubits are
measured with random angles, which again will not affect the
actual computation due to the fact that they are disentangled
from the rest of the qubits. However, as we demonstrate in
the next section, these dummy qubits allow Alice to easily
create isolated trap qubits within the resource state to enable
verification of the computation. Note that Alice must keep the
position of the dummy qubits hidden from Bob (i.e., part of
the secret) in order to keep the position of any trap qubits
hidden. The addition of the dummy qubits can also be viewed
as a method for the blind implementation of the Pauli Z basis
measurements. This is due to the fact that their position is
hidden from Bob and from his point of view they are measured
in the (X,Y ) plane as well. However, due to their preparation
state (|0〉 or |1〉) through the entangling step, they have the
same effect of measuring the corresponding qubit in the Pauli
Z basis. Therefore, we use the term blind PauliZ measurement
interchangeably with dummy qubits in the rest of the paper.
Due to the addition of dummy qubits, we will assume from
now on that n is an upper bound over the number of the input
or output qubits. This is required to allow the possibility of
having hidden trap or dummy qubits as part of the input or
output system. Therefore, in the design of the measurement
pattern, auxiliary qubits are added to the input and output space
in such a way that the actual computation remains intact.
Protocol 1. Generic hiding protocol with quantum input and output.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices is in such a way that the first n qubits are input and the last n qubits are output.
(ii) An n-qubit input state |I 〉.
(iii) A sequence of nonoutput measurement angles φ = (φi)1i(m−n) with φi ∈ A.
(iv) m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
(v) n random variables xi and m − n random variables ri with values taken uniformly at random from {0,1}.
(vi) A fixed function CG that for each nonoutput qubit i (1  i  m − n) computes the angle of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to
Bob. This function depends on φi,θi , ri , xi , and the result of the measurements that have been performed so far (s<i). The function CG
also depends on the flow (f, ) of the graph G. However, since the flow of the graph G is unique (if it exists), we need not take flow as
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a parameter of the function CG. We have
CG : {1, . . . ,(m − n)}×A×A×{0,1}×{0,1}×{0,1}m−n → A,
(i,φi,θi ,ri ,xi ,s) → (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ + θi + riπ
where xk for n + 1  k  m and also sk for any nondefined value of k is set to zero.
(2) Initial step
(i) Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the values in s to be 0. Next she sends m qubits in the order of the labeling of
the vertices of the graph as follows: First, Alice encodes the n-qubit input state as
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxnn Zn(θn)|I 〉
and sends them as the first n qubits to Bob. She then prepares m − n single qubits in the state |+θi 〉 (n + 1  i  m) and sends them
to Bob as the remaining qubits.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
(3) Step i: 1  i  m − n
(i) Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i,φi,θi ,ri ,xi ,s) and sends it to Bob.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi .
(iii) Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri .
(4) Step i: m − n + 1  i  m
(i) Bob’s move: Bob sends qubit i to Alice.
(ii) Alice’s move: Alice applies Xsf−1(i)Z
∑
j : i∈NG (f (j )) sj Z(θi) over qubit i.
Theorem 3. Assume Alice and Bob follow the steps of Protocol 3. Then the outcome obtained is the same as if the computation
took place over the graph G after removal of the dummy vertices in D, the set of positions of dummy qubits in G.
Protocol 2. Generic hiding protocol with classical input and output.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices are in such a way that the first n qubits are input and the last n qubits are output.
(ii) An n-bit input string c1, . . . ,cn.
(iii) A sequence of nonoutput measurement angles φ = (φi)1i(m−n) with φi ∈ A.
(iv) m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
(v) m random variables ri with values taken uniformly at random from {0,1}.
(vi) A fixed function CG that for each nonoutput qubit i (1  i  m) computes the angle of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob,
CG : {1, . . . ,m}×A×A×{0,1}×{0,1}m → A,
(i,φi,θi ,ri ,s) → (−1)sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ + θi + riπ,
where sk for any nondefined value of k is set to zero and also φi = 0 for m − n + 1  i  m.
(2) Initial step
(i) Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the values in s to be 0. Next she sends m qubits in the order of the labeling of
the vertices of the graph as follows: First, Alice encodes the n-bit string classical input c1, . . . ,cn as state
|e〉 = Zc11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zcnn (|+θ1 〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn 〉) = |+θ1+i1π 〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |+θn+inπ 〉
and sends them as the first n qubits to Bob. She then prepares m − n single qubits in the state |+θi 〉 (n + 1  i  m) and sends them to
Bob as the remaining qubits.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
(3) Step i: 1  i  m
(i) Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i,φi,θi ,ri ,s) and sends it to Bob.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi .
(iii) Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1;
the only new element is the effect of the dummy qubits. If
a dummy qubit is in the state |0〉, then in the entangling
step this qubit does not affect the state of the other qubits.
However, if the dummy qubit is in the state |1〉 then the
entangling operation will introduce a Pauli Z rotation on all
the neighboring qubits in G. Hence a qubit i ∈ D will be
affected by the operator
∏
j∈NG(i)∩D Z
dj
. In the initial step,
Alice already applied the operation
∏
j∈NG(i)∩D Z
dj over the
prepared qubits and therefore all qubits i ∈ D are in the desired
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Protocol 3. Generic hiding protocol with quantum input and output and dummy qubits.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Graph G over m vertices where labeling of vertices is in such a way that all the l input qubits are located among the first n  l qubits
and all the l output qubits are located among the last n qubits.
(ii) An l-qubit input state |I 〉.
(iii) The dummy qubits positions, set D, chosen among all possible vertices except the l input and l output qubits.
(iv) A sequence of nonoutput measurement angles φ = (φi)1i(m−n) with φi ∈ A, where φi = 0 for all i ∈ D.
(v) m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
(vi) l random variables xi , m − n random variables ri , and |D| random variables di with values taken uniformly at random from {0,1}.
(vii) A fixed function CG that for each nonoutput qubit i (1  i  m − n) computes the angle of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to
Bob,
CG : {1, . . . ,(m − n)}×A×A×{0,1}×{0,1}×{0,1}m−n → A,
(i,φi,θi ,ri ,xi ,s) → (−1)xi+sf−1(i)φi +
∑
j : i∈NG(f (j ))
sjπ + θi + riπ,
where xk for n + 1  k  m and sk for any nondefined value of k are set to zero.
(2) Initial step
(i) Alice’s move: Alice sends Bob the graph G and sets all the values in s to be 0. Alice encodes the l-qubit input state as
|e〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxln Zn(θl)|I 〉
and positions them among the first n qubits. She then prepares the remaining qubits in the following form:
|di〉∀i ∈ D,∏
j∈NG(i)∩D
Zdj |+θi 〉 =
∣∣+θi+∑j∈NG(i)∩D dj π 〉∀i ∈ D.
Then Alice sends Bob all m qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob receives m single qubits and entangles them according to G.
(3) Step i: 1  i  m − n
(i) Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i,φi,θi ,ri ,s) and sends it to Bob.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi .
(iii) Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi ⊕ ri .
(4) Step i: m − n + 1  i  m
(i) Bob’s move: Bob sends qubit i to Alice.
(ii) Alice’s move: Alice applies Xsf−1(i)Z
∑
j : i∈NG (f (j )) sj Z(θi) to qubit i.
state |+θi 〉, since Z operator is self-inverse. Moreover, all the
dummy qubits are unentangled with the rest of qubits and
are measured in a random basis with no consequences for the
part of the computation taking place over the graph G after
removing vertices D. 
Theorem 4. The hiding protocol with dummy qubits,
Protocol 3, is blind while leaking G and n.
Proof. Proof follows along similar lines of Theorem 2. We
define θ ′i = θi + πri + π
∑
j∈NG(i)∩D di . Alice’s total commu-
nication to Bob consists of the initial quantum states, which
we can rewrite as |+θ ′i−πri 〉 if the qubit is not a dummy qubit
or ∈R {|0〉,|1〉} if it is a dummy qubit, and the measurement
angles, which are set to be δi = φ′i + θ ′i − π
∑
j∈NG(i)∩D di .
As before, the values of δi are uniformly random since θ ′i are
uniformly random, and for any fixed values of δi tracing over
all ri , we obtain the initial quantum state for each qubit as
either
1
2
|+θ ′i 〉〈+θ ′i | +
1
2
|−θ ′i 〉〈−θ ′i | =
I
2
if the qubit was not a dummy or
1
2
|0〉〈0| + 1
2
|1〉〈1| = I
2
if the qubit was a dummy. Hence the qubits obtained by Bob
are always in the maximally mixed state and are not correlated
with each other. 
V. UNIVERSAL RESOURCE STATES
During a hiding protocol Bob learns the graph of entangle-
ment G; however, it was shown in [3] that it is possible for
Alice to choose a family of graphs corresponding to what were
termed brickwork states such that blindness of the angles, as
defined before, will permit Alice to hide the unitary operator
that the protocol is implementing, revealing only an upper
bound on the dimensions of the circuit required to implement
it. The key element to achieve this is the use of those universal
resources for MBQC [48] that are generic, hence revealing no
information about the structure of the underlying computation,
except the bounds on the size of input and the depth of the
computation. Moreover, to make the protocol practical from
Alice’s point, it is desirable to restrict the class of measurement
angles so that the required class of random qubits prepared
by Alice is also restricted. Note that exact universal blind
quantum computing could be achieved if Alice could prepare
separable single-qubit states |+θ 〉 with θ chosen randomly in
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FIG. 2. Brickwork state G6×21. Qubits are arranged according to
layer x and row y, corresponding to the vertices in the above graph,
and are originally in state |+〉. CTRL-Z gates are then performed
between qubits that are joined by an edge. A similar resource state
was proposed in [50].
[0,2π ) and if Bob could make any measurement with angles in
[0,2π ). Such a model requires Alice to communicate random
real angles to Bob and hence such a setting is unattractive
from a communications resources point of view. Similar to
the quantum circuit scenario, by the Solovay-Kitaev theorem,
a finite set of angles (for instance, a set that corresponds
to Hadamard and π8 -phase gates) can be used to efficiently
approximate any single-qubit unitary operator.5 For the rest
of this paper we will restrict our attention to approximate
universality and we use the fact that a large family of graph
states is approximately universal if one restricts the set of
angles to be in the set {0, ± π/4, ± π/2} [49]. We give two
such examples below.
Definition 4. A brickwork state Gn×m, where m ≡ 5 or 1
(mod 8), is an entangled state of n×m qubits constructed as
follows.
(i) Prepare all qubits in state |+〉 and assign to each qubit
an index (i,j ), i being a row (i ∈ [n]) and j being a column
(j ∈ [m]).
5More precisely, the Solovay-Kitaev theorem states that if the
subgroup generated by some subset of SU(2) operators is dense in
SU(2), then the approximation converges exponentially quickly to
any element of SU(2) in the number of these operators from a smaller
set one uses to approximate.
(ii) For each row, apply the operator CTRL-Z on qubits (i,j )
and (i,j + 1) where 1  j  m − 1.
(iii) For each column j ≡ 3 (mod 8) and each odd row i,
apply the operator CTRL-Z on qubits (i,j ) and (i + 1,j ) and
also on qubits (i,j + 2) and (i + 1,j + 2).
(iv) For each column j ≡ 7 (mod 8) and each even row i,
apply the operator CTRL-Z on qubits (i,j ) and (i + 1,j ) and
also on qubits (i,j + 2) and (i + 1,j + 2).
We will refer to the underlying graph of a brickwork state
as the brickwork graph and denote it with the same notation
by Gn×m (see Fig. 2).
Theorem 5 (universality). The brickwork state Gn×m is
universal for quantum computation. Furthermore, we only
require single-qubit measurements under the angles {0, ±
π/4, ± π/2} to achieve approximate universality [3] and
measurements can be done layer by layer.
Proof. The proof is straightforward (see details in [3])
based on constructing measurement patterns for elements of an
approximate set of universal gates that could be tiled together
as brickwork states as depicted in Fig. 3. 
Let us denote vertices of a brickwork graph Gn×m by (i,j )
(where 1  i  n,1  j  m). Then it is easy to verify that
the unique flow function of G is defined by
fG((i,j )) = (i,j + 1).
That is to say, the flow of each vertex in the graph is from its
immediate left neighbor in the same row. The corresponding
partial order ≺G is defined as the collection of sets Lj of all
vertices in the j th column of the brickwork graph
Lj = {(x,y)|1  x  n,y = j}.
Now suppose Alice has in mind a unitary operator U of size
2n×2n and the n-qubit input state |I 〉. Due to Theorem 5 there
exist an integer m and angles {φi,j }1in,1jm ∈ A such that
the measurement pattern with angles {φi,j } over the brickwork
state Gn×m, where the first n qubits are set to be in the state
|I 〉, approximates U |I 〉. Therefore, the last n qubits after the
measurements of the first m − n qubits and application of the
corresponding corrections induced by flow are in a state that
can be made arbitrarily close to U |I 〉. We can simply adapt
the generic hiding protocol to implement this measurement
pattern blindly as presented in [3].
As mentioned in Sec. IV, in order to construct a verification
scheme we make use of dummy qubits. While this presents
U1
U3
U1
U2
U3 =
U2
α
α
β
β
γ
γ
0
0
=
Rz(α)
Rz(α )
Rx(β)
Rx(β )
Rz(γ)
Rz(γ )
0
0
0
π
4
π
4
0
0
-π
4
=
•
FIG. 3. Measurement patterns implementing arbitrary single-qubit rotations and the CNOT operator. These patterns can be composed within
the brickwork state, as shown in the lower portion of the figure.
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Tape
FIG. 4. Cylinder brickwork state GC6×19.
a simple mechanism to achieve isolated trap qubits, the
presence of trap and dummy qubits disrupts the computation.
However, this can be fixed through a simple modification of
the brickwork state.
Definition 5. A cylinder brickwork state GCn×m is a modifi-
cation of the brickwork state of size n×m, for even n, where
the first and the last rows are connected such that the regular
brickwork structure is preserved, while introducing rotational
symmetry. We will refer to the underlying graph of a cylinder
brickwork state as the cylinder brickwork graph and denote it
with the same notation by GCn×m (see Fig. 4). A tape Ti in a
cylinder brickwork graph is the subgraph induced by all the
nodes of ith and (i + 1)th rows.
The cylinder brickwork state allows for a simple construc-
tion for trap-based verification, as discussed in Sec. VI. Next
we introduce another generic family called dotted-complete
graph states (see Fig. 5), which enables significant amplifica-
tion of the probability of detecting deviations from the compu-
tation, particularly in the case of quantum output, as discussed
in Sec. VII. The basic idea behind this universal resource
state is that it can be partitioned blindly into smaller universal
resource states, one of which will be used for the computation,
while the others will be used as traps for verification purposes.
To begin with, we need to introduce the graphs that we will
use and prove that they have some special properties.
Definition 6. We define the operator ∼(G) on graph G to be
the operator that transforms a graph G to a new graph denoted
by ˜G by replacing every edge inGwith a new vertex connected
to the two vertices originally joined by that edge. Let KN
denote the complete graph of N vertices. We call the quantum
state corresponding to the graph ˜KN the dotted-complete graph
K4 K4
~
~
FIG. 5. Example of the relationship between a complete graph
K4 and the corresponding dotted-complete graph ˜K4. The vertices in
black in ˜K4 denote the set P ( ˜K4), while the white vertices correspond
to A( ˜K4).
state denoted by ˜KN . We denote the set of vertices of ˜KN
previously inherited fromKN byP ( ˜KN ) and the vertices added
by the ∼( ) operation by A( ˜KN ). The number of the vertices
in the ˜KN graph is then equal to N (N + 1)/2.
The following definition and lemmas will be used in
manipulation of dotted-complete graph states.
Definition 7. We define the bridge operator on a vertex v of
degree 2 on graph G to be the operator that connects the two
neighbors of v and then removes vertex v and any associated
edges from G. We define the break operator on a vertex v
of graph G to be the operator that removes vertex v and any
associated edges from G. Let G be a graph on m vertices. Then
we say thatG is n universal, for n  m, if and only if any graph
of n vertices can be obtained from G through a sequence of
bridges and breaks.
Lemma 1. ˜KN is N universal and the bridge and break
operations used to obtain a target graph need only be performed
on vertices in A( ˜KN ).
Proof. Given any graph G on N vertices, associate each
vertex ui in G with a vertex vi in P ( ˜KN ). Each pair of vertices
(vi,vj ) in P ( ˜KN ) is connected through an intermediate vertex
of degree 2 in A( ˜KN ). Thus, by bridging over the intermediate
vertex if ui and uj are joined by an edge and breaking the
intermediate vertex otherwise, ˜KN reduces to G. As this is
true for all graphs G on N vertices, ˜KN is N universal. 
Lemma 2. Given a partitioning of the vertices P ( ˜KN ) into
n sets {Pi} containing Ni vertices, respectively, by applying a
sequence of break operations only, it is possible to transform
˜KN into n disconnected graphs ˜ki such that each one of them
is of the form ˜KNi and P ( ˜ki) = Pi .
Proof. As the vertices P ( ˜KN ) are associated with a
corresponding vertex in KN , the vertices of KN can be
partitioned into the sets {Pi}. As KN is the complete graph
the vertices within each partition Pi form a clique. Thus, by
removing edges between the partitions the resulting graph is
composed of n disconnected graphs {ki = KNi } such that the
vertices in ki are the vertices inPi . As removing an edge before
applying the ∼( ) operator is equivalent to applying a break
operation after the ∼( ) operator there exists a corresponding
sequence of break operations such that the resulting graph is
∼({ki}) = { ˜ki}. As ˜ki =∼(ki), it follows that P ( ˜ki) = Pi and
since ki = KNi then ˜ki = ˜KNi as required. 
Lemma 3. Given a graph ˜KN , by applying break operators
to every vertex in P ( ˜KN ) or A( ˜KN ), the resulting graph is
composed of the vertices of A( ˜KN ) or P ( ˜KN ), respectively,
and contains no edges.
Proof. As the ∼( ) operation only introduces vertices
connected to vertices in P ( ˜KN ), every vertex in A( ˜KN ) shares
edges only with vertices in P ( ˜KN ). Thus, when the vertices
in P ( ˜KN ) and their associated edges are removed by the
break operators, the vertices in A( ˜KN ) become disconnected.
Similarly, since ∼( ) removes all edges between vertices
in P ( ˜KN ), every vertex in P ( ˜KN ) shares edges only with
vertices in A( ˜KN ). Thus, when the vertices in A( ˜KN ) and
their associated edges are removed by the break operators, the
vertices in P ( ˜KN ) become disconnected. 
We now extend these results to graph states.
Lemma 4. Given two graph states |ψG1〉 and |ψG2〉
corresponding to graphs G1 and G2, respectively, if it is
possible to obtain G2 from G1 through a sequence of bridge
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and break operations, then it is possible to obtain |ψG2〉
from |ψG1〉 through a sequence of Pauli measurements and
local rotations about the Z axis through angles from the set
{0, π2 ,π, 3π2 }.
Proof. By measuring any qubit in a graph state with a
Pauli Z operator, we obtain a state equivalent up to local
Pauli Z corrections to the graph state obtained from the graph
when that vertex and its associated edges are removed. To
see this, we consider the operations this qubit undergoes:
It is first prepared in a state |+〉, then it interacts with its
neighbors via CTRL-Z gates, and then it is measured in the
Z basis. As the measurement commutes with the entangling
operation, this result is identical to the case where the
CTRL-Z gates are applied to the measured eigenstate of Z.
Thus, when the complete sequence of events is taken into
account, this operation is equivalent to the identity when the
measurement outcome is 0 and equivalent to local Pauli Z
operators applied to the neighbors of the measured site when
the measurement outcome is 1. This is then the graph state
equivalent of the break operation defined on the associated
graph.
If a vertex is of degree 2, then measuring the associated
qubit with the Pauli Y operator yields the graph state
corresponding to the graph obtained by applying a bridge
operation to that vertex, up to local Z rotations through an
angle ±π2 . To see this, we again consider the sequence of
operations the qubit undergoes: It is prepared in the state |+〉,
interacts with its neighbors, and then is measured in theY basis.
Immediately prior to measurement, the net operator applied
is 1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ I+ 1√
2
|1〉 ⊗ Z1 ⊗ Z2, where the subscripts 1 and
2 denote the neighbors of the measured qubit. Thus, if the
measurement result is 0, then this is equivalent to directly
applying the operator ei(π/4)Z1⊗Z2 to the neighboring qubits,
whereas if the measurement result is 1 this is equivalent to
applying the operator e−i(π/4)Z1⊗Z2 to these qubits. Since the
CTRL-Z gate can be written as either ei(π/4)(I−Z⊗I−I⊗Z+Z⊗Z) or
e−i(π/4)(I−Z⊗I−I⊗Z+Z⊗Z), the effect on the neighboring qubits
is equivalent to a CTRL-Z, up to local Z rotations by π2 (for a
measurement result of 0) or −π2 (for a measurement result of
1). This could also be derived via the stabilizer formalism. For
a more detailed discussion of the effect of Pauli measurements
in the measurement-based model, the reader is referred
to [51]. 
Theorem 6 (universality). The dotted-complete graph state
˜KN is universal for quantum computation. Furthermore, we
only require single-qubit measurements under the angles {0, ±
π/4, ± π/2} and in the Pauli Z basis to achieve approximate
universality, and measurements can be done layer-by-layer.
Proof. Due to Lemmas 1 and 4, by choosing N big
enough, we could construct the brickwork state Gn×m from
˜KN using only Pauli measurements. Hence, from Theorem 5
we obtain the universality of dotted-complete graph states and
approximate universality with only single-qubit measurements
under the angles {0, ± π/4, ± π/2} (which include the Pauli
Y measurements required to implement bridge operations) and
the Pauli Z basis measurements required to implement break
operations. 
From this result we can construct a new universal hiding
protocol based on dotted-complete graph states, as given in
Protocol 4. Interestingly, in the case of classical input and
output this new protocol does not even reveal the circuit
dimensions, but instead a single integer that is an upper bound
on the number of qubits required to implement the computation
in the measurement-based model.
Protocol 4. Dotted-complete graph state universal hiding protocol with quantum input and output.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Parameter N such that the desired computation could be obtained from the state ˜KN after a sequence of break and bridge operators
(Theorem 6). The labeling of vertices is in such a way that the first n qubits are input and the last n qubits are output.
(ii) The dummy qubits position, set D, is set to be the position of all the qubits that are required to be Pauli Z measured for performing
the break operators.
(iii) A sequence of nonoutput measurement angles φ = (φi)1i(m−n) with φi ∈ A, where φi = π2 for all i ∈ D and also for all the qubits
that are required to be Pauli Y measured to perform the bridge operators.
(iv) The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3.
Follow the steps of Protocol 3 where G is replaced with ˜KN .
Theorem 7. Protocol 4 is blind, while leaking at most n
and N .
Proof. As Bob entangles according to ˜KN , clearly the
parameter N is leaked. Additionally, in the case of quantum
output, Bob must be instructed how many qubits to return to
Alice and hence knows n. However, fixing these parameters,
due to Theorem 2, all the measurement angles including
the measurements for the bridge operators are blind to
Bob. Similarly, from Theorem 4 we have blindness for the
measurement corresponding to the break operators. Together
these guarantee the blindness of the operations required to
prepare a brickwork state from ˜KN . Finally, Theorem 2 proved
the blindness of the remaining measurements performed on the
prepared brickwork state. 
VI. VERIFICATION
This section deals with another property of the hiding
protocol called verification. This property requires that Alice
can verify with high probability whether Bob has followed
the instructions of the protocol and hence if the quantum or
classical output state is indeed in the correct form or whether
there has been a deviation and she should therefore reject
the output state. The main idea is to exploit blindness so
that Alice can expand the protocol to include trap qubits
where Alice knows in advance the classical outcome of these
specific measurements (i.e., the correct message from Bob
for these measurements), where the blindness ensures that
the position of these traps remains hidden from Bob. At the
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end Alice will accept the quantum or classical output only
if Bob has produced all of the expected outcomes for these
trap qubits measurements. The subtlety in verification is to
prove that the accepted quantum or classical output is indeed
correct.
It is essential that Alice keeps the position of these trap
qubits unknown to Bob so that he cannot attempt to interfere
with the actual computation of U while keeping the trap
qubits untouched. We will present a protocol where every
qubit of the underlying graph could potentially be an isolated
(unentangled) trap qubit in an unknown state |+θ 〉 for θ ∈ A.
In order to do so, it is enough to prepare all the neighboring
vertices of the trap qubit as dummy qubits; hence these dummy
qubits together with the trap qubits remain disentangled from
the rest of the graph during the preparation stage. Building
on this simple construction, by adding more traps and adding
error detection elements, we will present a final protocol in
which the probability of not detecting an incorrect outcome is
exponentially small.
In order to first demonstrate the main idea of this method of
verification, we ignore the universality property and only later
will we present a concrete universal blind quantum computing
protocol with the verification property. Hence, to obtain a
generic hiding protocol with a random unknown trap it is
sufficient to use Protocol 3, where Alice chooses a random
position t to be an isolated trap qubit (Protocol 5).
Protocol 5. Generic hiding quantum computation for unitary with dummy, trap, and quantum input and output.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Graph G over m vertices and a random position t among the vertices of G.
(ii) The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3, where φi = 0 for i = t and i ∈ D, where D contains the set of all neighbors of
position t in the original graph to create an isolated trap qubit at position t .
(2) Follow the steps of Protocol 3.
(3) Accept or reject
(i) After obtaining all the output qubits from Bob, if the trap qubit t is an output qubit, Alice measures it with angle δt = θt + rtπ to
obtain bt .
(ii) Alice accepts if bt = rt .
Theorem 4 directly implies that Protocol 5 is blind and
the position of the trap qubits t remains unknown to Bob.
Recall that at each stage i only qubit i is measured. We present
some intermediate definitions before formalizing the definition
of verification. All the protocols presented so far describe
the expected behavior of Alice and Bob in a hiding protocol.
Since we are concerned with the secrecy of Alice’s resources
we can assume that Alice always follows the steps of the
protocol. In fact, after the initial step when Alice draws all the
random variables θi and ri her behavior, for a fixed run of the
protocol, is deterministic. This means that at each step the next
move of Alice is determined completely by the past; however;
a malicious Bob might deviate in any way he desires. We
will define a run of protocol to be honest (Bob has behaved
as expected) or correct (the output is correct despite Bob’s
deviations) based on the outcome of all measurements and the
quantum output state if it exists.
Recall that in a generic hiding protocol with quantum input
and output the messages sent by Bob to Alice depend on a
collection of outcome measurements, si ∈ {0,1}. In fact, Bob
will send the outcome value bi and then Alice, depending on ri ,
will reset them to their corrected values si . In what follows we
will deal with the corrected outcome measurement, that is, si .
Similarly, at the end of the protocol Bob will send Alice some
quantum output state in the output Hilbert spaceHO that needs
to be corrected depending on all the measurements outcomes.
In what follows we consider the corrected quantum output state
ρ. Note that the values of si and ρ depend on Alice’s specific
random choices and also Bob’s general strategy of deviation.
We treat this information as a single density operator to deal
uniformly with both classical and quantum output. Finally,
in order to consider the most general deviation that Bob can
perform during a run of protocol we consider a collection of
unitary operators, each acting at a stage of the protocol on the
private qubits of Bob and all the other qubits and classical bits
sent by Alice to Bob.
Definition 8. Consider a particular run of a generic hiding
protocol, where all the following parameters are fixed: Alice’s
angles of measurements φ = (φi)1i(m−n); Alice’s random
variables x = (xi)1in, r = (ri)1i(m−n), θ = (θi)1im, and
d = (di)i∈D; Alice’s input state |I 〉; the number of Bob’s
private qubits B; and Bob’s deviation unitaries at each stage
of the protocol U = {Ui}0im+1 acting on all quantum and
classical messages. We define the outcome density operator
(of all classical and quantum messages sent by Bob to Alice)
as follows:
Bj (ν) =
∑
s∈{0,1}|Oc |
pν,j (s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsν,j ,
where ν collectively denotes Alice’s choice of variables t , x,
r , θ , and d; j ranges over Bob’s choices B and U ; s ranges
over all possible values of the corrected values {si} of the
measurement outcomes {bi} sent by Bob to Alice; and ρsν,j is
the reduced density operator for the nonmeasured qubits with
the corresponding correction operators for the measurement
outcomes s has been applied. We call the outcome density
operator B0(ν), obtained from a run of the protocol where all
Ui are set to be the identity operator, the exact outcome density
operator. This is the outcome density operator obtained from
a run where Bob exactly follows the step of the protocol.
Note that if we were dealing only with a deterministic
pattern over a connected graph state then the outcome density
operator could have been simplified to a fixed pure state of
the output qubits, independent of the measurement outcomes.
Moreover, in such a scenario the probability of each branch
of the computation would have been the same. However, the
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above definition aims to capture any general deviation by
Bob that could affect the determinism and probability of the
branches. Also, since we will have dummy and trap qubits,
then not all the possible branches will be equally probable. The
outcome density operator, depending on all the random choices
of Alice and Bob, can be classified as follows below. Although
not all mentioned categories will be used in the remainder of
the paper, we give them here for completeness and to highlight
the subtle differences between possible outcomes.
Definition 9. We say the outcome density operator Bj (ν) is
honest if it is indistinguishable from the exact outcome density
operator
‖Bj (ν) − B0(ν)‖tr = 0,
where ‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace norm. It is called correct if the
quantum output state and the trap outcome measurement is
indistinguishable from the corresponding value of the exact
outcome density operator:
‖Tri ∈O,i =t [Bj (ν)] − Tri ∈O,i =t [B0(ν)]‖tr = 0.
It is called lucky if bt = rt and finally it is called incorrect
if it is lucky but the quantum output state Tri ∈{O\{t}}[Bj (ν)]
is orthogonal to the corresponding subsystem of the exact
outcome density operator. Note that for the classical output
scenario, any bit flip implies orthogonality.
Alice should not care if Bob’s deviation leads to a correct
outcome density operator, as the final quantum or classical
output is in the correct state. Therefore, in the definition of
a verifiable blind quantum computation we aim to bound the
probability of Alice being fooled, i.e., the probability of Alice
accepting an incorrect outcome density operator. Any outcome
density operator either results in st = rt or is contained
within the subspace of correct and incorrect outcome states.
Hence, intuitively, a protocol is defined to be verifiable if the
corresponding outcome state is far from any incorrect outcome
states. Following the approach of [52], we first define the no-
tion of correctness. Recall that for simplicity we have assumed
that the computation is deterministic and the input is in a pure
state and hence the ideal output will necessarily be a pure state.
This restriction to pure states mirrors the approach of [52].
Definition 10. Let P νincorrect be the projection onto the sub-
space of all the possible incorrect outcome density operators
for the fixed choice of Alice’s random variables ν. It will
be convenient to divide ν into two subsets depending on
whether the secret variables correspond to the trap setting or the
remainder of the computation. Thus we define νT = {t,rt ,θt }
and νC = ν/νT . When the output state is a pure state, P νincorrect
is given by
(I− |	ideal〉〈	ideal|) ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣,
where |	ideal〉〈	ideal| = Tri ∈{O\{t}}[B0(ν)] and where |ηνTt 〉 =
|+θt 〉 when t ∈ O and |ηνTt 〉 = |rt 〉 otherwise. Let p(ν) be the
probability of Alice choosing random variables parametrized
by ν, that is, the probability of choosing a particular vertex,
among all possible vertices of the graph, to be the trap
position (denoted by a random variable t) and the probability
of choosing random variables r , x, θ , and d (as defined in
Definition 8). Given 0   < 1, we define a protocol to be
 verifiable if for any choice of Bob’s strategy (defined as
in Definition 8 and denoted by the index j ) the probability
of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is
bounded by :
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)P νincorrect Bj (ν)
)
 .
Recall that B0(ν) is the output density operator of an honest
run after the corrections have been performed. Hence, in the
above definition |	ideal〉 is independent of ν, since for an honest
run of the protocol the output state is independent of Alice’s
secret parameters, via the correctness theorem.
Theorem 8. Protocol 5 is 1 − 12m verifiable in general, and
in the special case of purely classical output the protocol is
also 1 − 1
m
verifiable, where m is the total number of qubits in
the protocol.
Proof. At the beginning of the protocol, Alice chooses the
independent and uniform random variables for ν. Next Alice
prepares the input qubits in the form
|eν〉 = Xx11 Z1(θ1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxln Zn(θl)|I 〉
and positions them among the first n qubits. Recall that n > |I |
and hence the trap qubit might be among this set of qubits. She
then prepares the remaining qubits in the form (where D is the
index of the dummy qubits)
|di〉∀i ∈ D,∏
j∈NG(i)∩D
Zdj |+θi 〉 =
∣∣+θi+∑j∈NG(i)∩D djπ 〉∀i ∈ D
and sends allm qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices
of the graph. We represent the whole m qubit state as |Mν〉. We
can treat all the measurement angles δi as orthogonal quantum
states |δi〉. For a fixed choice of Alice’s random variables (ν)
and Bob’s strategy (j ), Bob’s output from the computation can
be written in the form of the output of a circuit computation
as depicted in Fig. 6. Note that this is the state of the system
before the relevant corrections for Alice’s secret key have been
applied to yield the outcome density operator Bj (ν).
While in the actual protocol, at step i, Alice computes δi as a
function of s<i , which in turn is calculated from b<i and r<i , we
can rewrite the circuit from Fig. 6 in such a way that the values
δi are part of the initial state, without affecting causality as they
do not interact with anything until after the corresponding bi
has been generated. This intuition is made rigorous in Eq. (1)
via the inclusion of projections to ensure consistency. This will
allow us to reorder all the operators Ui to the end to obtain the
new circuit shown in Fig. 7. Note that Fig. 7 is not an actual
run of the protocol; it is a mathematical equivalent of Fig. 6
where the values of bi have been fixed to permit us to commute
the operators as depicted. However, in the following proof we
have considered any general deviation performed by Bob, that
is to say, we consider any arbitrary Ui operators.
In the rest of this proof we will use t to represent both
the random variable and also the position of the trap qubit.
We define by  = U ′m−nU ′m−n−1 · · ·U ′1 the overall action of
Bob’s deviation and by P = [⊗1im−n HiZi(δi)]EG the
action of the exact protocol prior to measurement. Here
and in Fig. 7 we have taken U ′i = PiUiP†i , where Pi =⊗
i+1jm−n HjZj (δj ). Further we define by
|	ν,b〉 =
⊗
1im
|Mν〉
⊗
1jm−n
∣∣δbj 〉
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|0 ⊗B
EG
U1
Uk
Um-n
Z(δk) H bm-n
Quantum
Output
|
|δ1
|δk
|δm−n
b1Z(δ1) H
Z(δk) H bk
Mν
FIG. 6. Run of protocol together with Bob’s deviation represented as Ui operators. The entangling operator EG is the collection of all the
required CTRL-Z operators corresponding to the graph edges. Note that in Definition 8 we also considered an operator U0 representing Bob’s
initial deviation. In the figure, for simplicity, we have commuted U0 and combined it with U1. Trivially, if all the Ui operators are set to be
identity the above circuit converges to the exact run of the protocol, where a measurement in the basis |±δi 〉 is implemented using the controlled
Z rotation followed by a Hadamard gate and finally a Pauli Z basis (computation basis) measurement on the corresponding qubits.
the joint state of the initial (input, dummy, and prepared)
qubits sent by Alice to Bob and the classical angles δbi ,
where b represents a possible branch of the computation as
parametrized by the measurement results {bi} sent by Bob to
Alice. Finally, in line with Definition 10, we define CνC,b to
be the Pauli operator that maps the final quantum output state
to the correct one depending on the random variable νC and
computation branch b. Hence we have
Bj (ν) = TrB
(∑
b
|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bP[(⊗B |0〉〈0|) ⊗ |	ν,b〉
× 〈	ν,b|]P††C†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
)
, (1)
|0 ⊗B
EG
U′1
U′k
U′m-n
Z(δm-n) H bm-n
Quantum
Output
|δ1
|δk
|δm−n
b1Z(δ1) H
Z(δk) H bk
|Mν
FIG. 7. The fact that any Uj in Fig. 6 is independent of all δi>j allows us to reposition the deviation to the end of the circuit as shown
above. Hence we can rewrite Bob’s deviation as U ′i = PiUiP†i , where Pi =
⊗
i+1jm−n HjZj (δj ).
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where (cr )i = ri for all i = t , (cr )t = 0, and the subscript
B denotes that the partial trace is taken over Bob’s private
register. Here cr is used to compactly deal with the fact that in
the protocol all measured qubits are decrypted by applying an
XOR operation with r , except for the trap qubit, which remains
uncorrected. Note that, in the above, the operator 〈b| · · · |b〉 acts
upon the subspace of all measured qubits and |b + cr〉 · · · 〈b +
cr | store the corrected outcome of the measurement. The
above equation includes the dependence of δi on previous
measurement results via the inclusion of the parameter b
in the initial state |	ν,b〉. The projectors |b + cr〉〈b| and
|b〉〈b + cr | then enforce consistency, by ensuring that mea-
surement results match the values used in the computation of
subsequent δi .
We take P⊥ to be the projection onto the subspace of
incorrect states for the nontrap qubits, after Alice’s final
corrections have been applied to any quantum output. Hence
P νincorrect = P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣,
where |ηνTt 〉 = |rt 〉t for 1  t  m − n and |ηνTt 〉 = |+θt 〉t for
m − n + 1  t  m. Here we use the subscript on the ket to
identify the relevant qubit. Thus we have
Tr
[
P νincorrectBj (ν)
] = Tr
[
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣
(∑
b
|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bP[(⊗B |0〉〈0|) ⊗ |	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|]P††C†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
)]
.
As Bob’s private register is traced out, the net result of  is to apply a completely positive trace preserving map of the other
qubits. Taking the Kraus operators associated with this operator to be {χk}, with
∑
k χkχ
†
k = I, we have
Tr
[
P νincorrect Bj (ν)
] = ∑
k
∑
b
Tr
[(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bχkP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†χk†C†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |].
Since any Kraus operator can be written as a linear combination of Pauli operators with complex coefficients, we have
χk =
∑
i αkiσi , where
∑
k
∑
i αkiα
∗
ki = 1 and σi is a Pauli operator acting on the joint quantum state of the system. Therefore,
the above equation can be written as
Tr
[
P νincorrectBj (ν)
] = ∑
k
∑
b
Tr
⎡
⎣(P⊥ ⊗ ∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,b
⎛
⎝∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kjσiP|	ν〉〈	ν |P†σj
⎞
⎠C†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
⎤
⎦
=
∑
k
∑
b
Tr
⎛
⎝∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
⎞
⎠.
In order to determine which σi terms have a nonzero contribution in the above sum after the projection operator is taken into
account, it will be necessary to look at the structure of each such Pauli operator. To this end, we will denote by σi|γ the action of
σi on qubit γ and hence σi|γ ∈ {I,X,Y,Z}. For simplicity, we assume each δi is encoded across three qubits (since there are only
eight possible angles). Thus, we have 1  γ  m + 3(m − n), where 1  γ  m identifies qubits received from Alice and the
remaining γ values identify the qubits containing δi . Without loss of generality, we can assume that the qubits representing the
values of δ remain unchanged by Bob’s deviation and hence we can take σi|γ ∈ {I,Z} for all m < γ .
The probability of Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is given by
pincorrect = Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)P νincorrectBj (ν)
)
.
This can be calculated via the expression for Tr[P νincorrect Bj (ν)] obtained earlier,
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr[P νincorrect Bj (ν)]
=
∑
k,b
Tr
⎛
⎝∑
ν
p(ν)
∑
i,j
αkiα
∗
kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
⎞
⎠
=
∑
b,i,j,k
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
)
.
By noting that |bj + crj 〉 commutes with |	ν,b〉〈	ν,b| for all j = t , the above expression can be rewritten as
pincorrect =
∑
b,i,j,k
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|bt 〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈bt |
)
.
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In order to obtain an upper bound for the above expression we make use of sets of indices γ of qubits such that the action of
σi at that position σi|γ is a particular Pauli operator, which we define as follows:
Ai = {γ : σi|γ = I, 1  γ  m}, Bi = {γ : σi|γ = X, 1  γ  m},
Ci = {γ : σi|γ = Y, 1  γ  m}, Di = {γ : σi|γ = Z, 1  γ  m}.
Note that in the above we restrict attention to the set of qubits originally sent from Alice to Bob (which is why 1  γ  m) and
disregard the action on Bob’s private qubits. Additionally, we will make use of a superscript O to denote subsets of the above sets
subject to the constraint that γ is an output qubit (m − n < γ ). Thus, for example, DOi = {γ : σi|γ = Z, m − n + 1  γ  m}.
We note that only σi and σj operators for which Tr(P⊥σiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σj ) = 0 contribute to pincorrect. With the above
definitions in place, we can express succinctly a necessary condition for this to hold as |Bi | + |Ci | + |DOi |  1 (with i ∈ Ei) and|Bj | + |Cj | + |DOj |  1 (with j ∈ Ej ). That is to say, one or both of the following has happened: σi (σj ) has produced an incorrect
outcome for one or more of the measurement results and hence |Bi \ BOi | + |Ci \ COi |  1 (|Bj \ BOj | + |Cj \ COj |  1) or σi
(σj ) acts nontrivially on the quantum output and hence |BOi | + |COi | + |DOi |  1 (|BOi | + |COj | + |DOj |  1). Using this set
notion and by taking the trace over the subspace of the measurement results except for the trap qubit we obtain
pincorrect =
∑
k,b
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|bt 〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈bt |
)
,
where we take |bt 〉 to have have unit dimension if t ∈ O. The reason for doing this is to allow a uniform treatment of trap qubits
independent of whether or not the trap occurs on a measured qubit. Taking b′ = {bi}i =t , a substring of b that excludes the value
for the trap measurement, the above equation can be written as
pincorrect =
∑
k,b
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kj
[
P⊥ ⊗
(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣bt 〉 〈bt |)]〈b′|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b′〉
)
.
Note in the above that if the trap is measured we have 〈ηνTt |bt 〉 = δηνTt ,bt ; otherwise |bt 〉〈bt | = 1. Hence we have
pincorrect =
∑
k,b′
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
Tr
(∑
ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kj
(
P⊥ ⊗
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b′〉〈b′|CνC,b′σiP|	ν,b′ 〉〈	ν,b′ |P†σjC†νC,b′
)
=
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
⎡
⎢⎣(P⊥ ⊗ ∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣)|b′〉〈b′|CνC,b′
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠P|	ν,b′ 〉〈	ν,b′ |P†
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠
†
C
†
νC,b′
⎤
⎥⎦

∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
⎡
⎢⎣(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |b′〉〈b′|)CνC,b′
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠P|	ν,b′ 〉〈	ν,b′ |P†
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠
†
C
†
νC,b′
⎤
⎥⎦
=
∑
k,b′
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr
⎡
⎢⎣(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |b′〉〈b′|)
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠P|	ν,b′ 〉〈	ν,b′ |P†
⎛
⎝∑
i∈Ei
αkiσi
⎞
⎠
†⎤⎥⎦,
where the inequality follows from the fact that the projector P⊥ acts on a positive semidefinite matrix and the last equality follows
from the fact that both remaining projectors act as the identity on qubits in O.
Next we attempt to show that a necessary requirement for a term in the above summation over i and j to be nonzero is that
i = j . As per the proof of blindness, summing over νC yields the maximally mixed state of the system received from Alice.
Hence we have
pincorrect 
∑
k,b′,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
[(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |b′〉〈b′|)σi
(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |δt 〉〈δt | ⊗ ITr(I )
)
σj
]
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
[∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣σi
(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |δt 〉〈δt | ⊗ ITr(I )
)
σj
]
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
∑
j∈Ej
αikα
∗
jkp(νT )Tr
[〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi
(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |δt 〉〈δt | ⊗ ITr(I )
)
σj
∣∣ηνTt 〉
]
.
As all Pauli matrices other than the identity are traceless, any terms in the sum that are nonzero necessarily have σi|γ = σj |γ
everywhere except for γ = t and the corresponding δ register. We then consider separately the two cases corresponding
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to whether the trap is located in the quantum output or not. If t ∈ O then the δ register does not exist and using the
fact that
∑
θt ,rt
Tr(〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉) = 0, unless σi|t = σj |t , we arrive at the conclusion that the only terms that
contribute to pincorrect are those where σi = σj . If, on the other hand, t /∈ O, then averaging over rt alone is sufficient to
give Tr(〈ηνTt |σi |ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt |σj |ηνTt 〉) = 0 and hence σi|t = σj |t . In this case, averaging over θ yields the δt register in the maximally
mixed state and hence, as before, σi and σj must act identically on these qubits too, in order to avoid contributing zero to the
value of pincorrect. Consequently, the only terms that contribute are those for which σi = σj . Using this identity with our previous
expression for pincorrect, we obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
αikα
∗
ikp(νT )Tr
[〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi
(∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣⊗ |δt 〉〈δt | ⊗ ITr(I )
)
σi
∣∣ηνTt 〉
]
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
|αik|2p(νT )Tr
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)
=
∑
k,νT
∑
i∈Ei
|αik|2p(νT )
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)2
= 1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
∑
t,rt ,θt
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)2
= 1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
( ∑
tm−n,θt ,rt
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)2 + ∑
m−n<t,θt ,rt
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)2
)
= 1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
( ∑
tm−n,θt ,rt
(〈rt |σi|t |rt 〉)2 +
∑
m−n<t,θt ,rt
(〈+θt |σi|t |+θt 〉)2
)
= 1
16m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
[(
16
∣∣Ai \ AOi ∣∣+ 16∣∣Di \ DOi ∣∣)+ (8∣∣BOi ∣∣+ 8∣∣COi ∣∣+ 16∣∣AOi ∣∣)]
= 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
(
2|Ai | + 2
∣∣Di \ DOi ∣∣+ ∣∣BOi ∣∣+ ∣∣COi ∣∣).
This can be further simplified, since |Ai | + |Bi | + |Ci | +
|Di | = m, giving
pincorrect 
1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
[
2m − 2(|Bi | + |Ci | + ∣∣DOi ∣∣)
+ ∣∣BOi ∣∣+ ∣∣COi ∣∣]
 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
(
2m − |Bi | − |Ci | − 2
∣∣DOi ∣∣)
 1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2(2m − 1)
 1 − 1
2m
for the general case. However, for the specific case of only
classical output, this bound can be made tighter by performing
the simplification in a different way, since |BOi | = |COi | =|DOi | = 0, and hence
pincorrect 
1
2m
∑
k
∑
i∈Ei
|αki |2
(
2|Ai |+2
∣∣Di \ DOi ∣∣
+ ∣∣BOi ∣∣−∣∣COi ∣∣)
= 1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |1
|αki |2(|Ai | + |Di |)
= 1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |1
|αki |2(m − |Bi | − |Ci |)
 1
m
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |1
|αki |2(m − 1)
 1 − 1
m
.

This single trap construction will be generalized in the next
section to allow for exponential suppression of the probability
of accepting an incorrect outcome even in the case of quantum
output. We finish this section by showing that even this
simple construction can be used to verify universal quantum
computation, using the cylinder brickwork state presented in
Sec. V.
It is easy to verify that if Alice chooses a random row of a
cylinder graph GCn×m (Fig. 4) and prepares all the qubits of that
row in the states |zi〉 where zi ∈R {0,1} and the rest of nodes
in the state |+〉, then after entangling according to the cylinder
brickwork graph the obtained state is G(n−1)×m
⊗m
i=1 |zi〉. By
choosing a random trap location and a dummy tape that
contains its neighborhood we can construct a single-trap
verifiable universal blind quantum computing protocol, given
by Protocol 6 and illustrated in Fig. 8.
Corollary 1. Protocol 6 is universal, blind while leaking
at most m and n, and 1 − 12m verifiable in general and 1 − 1m
verifiable in the case of classical output.
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(a)           (c)
(b)           (d)
Tape
Tape
FIG. 8. Single-trap verifiable universal blind quantum computation using the cylinder brickwork state. (a) A random qubit is chosen to be
the trap qubit, the (red) filled node. (b) All other vertices in the tape containing the trap qubit, the solid (black) nodes, are set to be dummy
qubits. (c) This results in an isolated trap qubit in the state |+θ 〉 together with many dummy qubits after entanglement operations are applied
by the server. (d) The net result, after discarding the dummy qubits, is a disentangled trap qubit in a product state with a brickwork state.
Proof. Since the dummy qubits are prepared in eigenstates
of the Pauli Z operator, they remain in a product state with the
rest of the system after the entangling operations are applied by
Bob. The result, as depicted in Fig. 8, is that the trap qubit also
remains in a product state and a brickwork state is prepared
in the subsystem excluding T . The universality property then
follows directly from the universality of the brickwork state
from Theorem 5. As Protocol 6 is a special case of Protocol
3, the blindness property follows directly from Theorem 4 and
therefore the angles of measurement φi remain secret from
Bob. Moreover, the universality of the cylinder brickwork
state guarantees that Bob’s knowledge of GCn×m does not reveal
anything about the underlying computation except n andm. As
Protocol 6 is also a special case of Protocol 5, the verifiability
property follows directly from Theorem 8. 
VII. PROBABILITY AMPLIFICATION FOR UNIVERSAL
VERIFIABLE BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION
In the preceding section we presented a very simple
verifiable protocol where the probability of Bob succeeding
in making Alice accept an incorrect outcome density operator
was strictly less than 1. Building upon that simple construction,
by adding more traps and making the computation fault
tolerant, we can make the probability of Alice accepting an
incorrect outcome density operator as
Protocol 6. Single-trap verifiable universal blind quantum computation.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) A graph G = GCn×m and a randomly chosen vertex t of G.
(ii) The rest of the resources are the same as Protocol 3, where φi = 0 for i = t and i ∈ D, where D contains the set of all vertices in a
tape T that contains position t and all of its neighbors.
(2) Follow the steps of Protocol 3.
(3) Accept or reject
(i) After obtaining all the output qubits from Bob, if the trap qubit t is an output qubit, Alice measures it with angle δt = θt + rtπ to
obtain bt .
(ii) Alice accepts if bt = rt .
small as required. The central idea is to design a protocol with
O(N ) many traps in essentially random locations, where N is
the number of qubits in the protocol, to increase the probability
of any local error being detected. The fault tolerance is added
to increase the minimum weight of any operator that leads to an
incorrect outcome and hence further increase the probability
of detection. Here and in what follows, the weight of a Pauli
operator is defined to be the number of qubits upon which it
acts nontrivially. First, given such a protocol, we show how
it amplifies the verification parameter. We then present the
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central contribution of this paper, a universal verifiable blind
quantum computing protocol that achieves the probability
amplification without any such assumptions.
Theorem 9. Let P be a blind quantum computing protocol
on N qubits with NT isolated traps in the states |+θt 〉 at a set
of positions T chosen uniformly at random. Let NT /N be a
constant c. Take σ = {σ i} to be a set of Pauli operators such
that for at most d distinct indices i we have σ i ∈ {X,Y,Z} and
for the remaining indices σ i = I . Assume that the underlying
computation ofP is encoded in such a way that for any such σ ,
if each measurement result or unmeasured qubit i is modified
by applying σ i , then either the computation is correct or an
error is detected when the output is decoded. Then the protocol
is (1 − c2 )d verifiable in general and (1 − c)d verifiable in the
case of purely classical output.
Proof. In order to exploit Theorem 8, we notionally partition
the qubits into independent sets with one single trap qubit in
each set. These partitions amount to extra information about
the location of the trap qubits and hence their inclusion can
only serve to increase the probability of Bob convincing Alice
to accept an incorrect state. Thus the bound we obtain with this
additional information is still an upper bound on the probability
of Alice accepting an incorrect output when these partitions
are unknown. There are NT many such sets Sγ with 1/c many
qubits in each set. We adopt a similar proof strategy to that
used to prove Theorem 8, taking
P νincorrect = P⊥
⊗
t∈T
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣
as the projection onto the subspace of incorrect outcomes.
As in the proof of Theorem 8, only those Pauli operators
contribute to pincorrect where one or both of the following has
happened: σi has produced an incorrect outcome for some
of the measurement results bi or σi acts nontrivially on the
quantum output. Now due to the error-detection property of
the encoding assumed in the statement of the theorem, we
need to consider only those σi where |Bi | + |Ci | + |DOi |  d.
Following the steps of the proof of Theorem 8, we obtain
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr[P νincorrectBj (ν)] ∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |+|DOi |d
|αki |2
∑
T
p(T )
∏
t∈T
(∑
θt ,rt
p(θt )p(rt )
(〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi|t ∣∣ηνTt 〉)2
)
.
Here we can exploit the structure we have introduced through the sets Sγ
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |+|DOi |d
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
∑
tγ ,θtγ ,rtγ
p(tγ )p
(
θtγ
)
p
(
rtγ
)〈
ηνtγ
∣∣σi|tγ ∣∣ηνtγ 〉2,
where tγ is taken to be the location of the trap qubit in set Sγ . Rearranging the above and substituting in the values of p(tγ ),
p(θtγ ), and p(rtγ ), we obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |+|DOi |d
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
∑
tγ ,θtγ ,rtγ
c
16
〈
ηνtγ
∣∣σi|tγ ∣∣ηνtγ 〉2.
Note that within each set the position of the trap is chosen uniformly at random and so the probability of detection by that trap
corresponds to the bound obtained for Theorem 8. Going through the steps of the proof of Theorem 8, we obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |+|DOi |d
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2|Aiγ | + 2
∣∣Diγ \ DOiγ ∣∣+ ∣∣BOiγ ∣∣+ ∣∣COiγ ∣∣)
=
∑
k
∑
i:|Bi |+|Ci |+|DOi |d
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2
c
− 2∣∣DOiγ ∣∣− |Biγ | − |Ciγ | − ∣∣Biγ \ BOiγ ∣∣− ∣∣Ciγ \ COiγ ∣∣
)
,
where we use the additional γ subscript on sets |Aiγ |, . . . ,|Diγ | to indicate subsets of the respective sets, subject to the restriction
that the elements are also in Sγ . For convenience we define wiγ = |Biγ | + |Ciγ | + |DOiγ | and wi = |Bi | + |Ci | + |DOi |. Thus we
obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
c
2
(
2
c
− wiγ −
∣∣Biγ \ BOiγ ∣∣− ∣∣Ciγ \ COiγ ∣∣− ∣∣DOiγ ∣∣
)

∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
(
1 − cwiγ
2
)
.
We now make use of the fact that, for any positive a, 1 − ac2  [1 − (a − 1) c2 ](1 − c2 ). As wiγ is a non-negative integer, we can
recursively apply this identity to obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
(
1 − c
2
)wiγ
=
∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
(
1 − c
2
)∑NT
γ=1 wiγ
=
∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
(
1 − c
2
)wi

∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
(
1 − c
2
)d

(
1 − c
2
)d
.
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P H
=
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Mcomp
Mreduce
MP
MA
P1
P2
P
P1
P2
P
3
3
K˜15
K˜5
K˜5
K˜5
K˜5
MP
M
Z Z
Z
Z
Y
ZZ
Y
YY
Z Z
Z
Z
Z
ZZ
Z
Z
ZZ
Z Z
ZZ
FIG. 9. Graphical depiction of Protocol 8. In this figure we replace the Raussendorf et al. encoding in the first step with a simpler
computation, as to include a full encoding yields graphs too large to reasonably draw.
In the case of purely classical output this bound can be
improved, since |BOi | = |COi | = |DOi | = 0. Going through the
same steps with this additional constraint gives
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i:wid
|αki |2
NT∏
γ=1
(1 − cwiγ )  (1 − c)d .

We can now present the final contribution of this pa-
per, a scheme for blind quantum computing that has all
the previously described properties: correctness, universality,
blindness of angles, input, output, computation, and more
importantly verifiability with exponentially small probability
of error. Roughly speaking, universality and correctness will
be obtained by using dotted-complete graph states (similar to
Protocol 4). In order to achieve verification we exploit the
idea of dummy qubits (similar to Protocol 3) to create, blindly,
out of a dotted-complete graph state ˜K3N three disconnected
smaller dotted-complete graph states ˜KN . Then we use two of
these graph states to createO(N ) isolated trap qubits at random
positions (similar to Protocol 5). The final step is to perform
the actual computation over the remaining dotted-complete
graph state in such a way that the stated property in Theorem
9 is also satisfied, that is, to have the measurement pattern
encoded in such a way that any Pauli error with weight
less than d will be either corrected or detected. Such an
encoding exists through the fault-tolerant one-way quantum
computing scheme of [41]. All that is needed is to create a
three-dimensional cluster state from the dotted-complete graph
state and proceed with the fault-tolerant computation scheme
of Raussendorf et al. [41,53].6
We first give a concrete protocol for choosing the required
parameters for the Raussendorf et al. scheme, given the desired
security threshold for the verification (see Protocol 7). This
will fix the size of the dotted-graph state N required for the
actual computation. However, as stated above, we will start
with a dotted-complete graph state of size 3N and break it into
three smaller dotted-complete graph states of size N each (see
Fig. 9). We will refer to these graphs as the white trap graph,
the black trap graph, and the computation graph. In the white
trap graph all the vertices in P ( ˜KN ) will become isolated traps
(called white traps) by choosing all the vertices in A( ˜KN ) to
be dummy qubits. Similarly, in the black trap graph all the
vertices in A( ˜KN ) will become isolated traps (called black
traps) by choosing all the vertices in P ( ˜KN ) to be dummy
6In its original form, this scheme requires Z-basis measurements to
be made adaptively, which is not easily implementable using dummy
qubits. However, the location of the dummy qubits can be fixed by
always including a correction step for each gate teleportation in the
logical circuit, where the angle of the correction is adapted based
on the outcome of the teleportation. An alternative option is to use a
slightly modified version of the scheme due to Morimae and Fujii [31],
which requires only measurements in the X-Y plane. Although we
assume the first scenario here, an almost identical proof applies to the
second scenario.
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qubits. We have to choose both type of vertices [A( ˜K3N ) and
P ( ˜K3N )] to be potentially isolated traps, otherwise Bob could
choose to cheat on one type rather than the other one. In order
to make the position of traps random, Alice will choose a
random partition of P ( ˜K3N ) into three equal size sets and will
choose appropriate dummy qubits (similar to Lemma 2) to
obtain the three disconnected graphs. Note that this will lead
to random positions for trap qubits; however, the positions
of trap qubits will be also correlated with each other and we
will take care of this issue when we present the proof of the
verification. The above procedure is formalized in Protocol
7 and finally Protocol 8 presents a hiding protocol that is
universal, verifiable, and blind.
As a high-level overview of the fault-tolerance scheme,
qubits are encoded topologically as chains of defects (qubits
to be measured in theZ basis) of finite thickness and separation
(referred to as the scale parameter) that trace out a path
through the three-dimensional structure of the resource state.
The encoding forces nondetectable errors to be topologically
nontrivial chains, either connecting or encircling defect chains.
Certain Clifford group operations are implemented directly by
braiding these defect chains. For the remaining operations
required for universality it is necessary to implement the
gate by first distilling a suitable resource state that is then
used to implement the gate via teleportation (all within the
topologically encoded computation). While the teleportation
can be done with Clifford group operations, the distillation
is implemented on a concatenated encoding where at each
level of concatenation the corresponding distillation step
is topologically encoded with progressively higher defect
thicknesses and scale parameters. At the lowest level, however,
the operations are performed directly on physical qubits and
so the defect chains are only a single qubit in diameter.
Theorem 10. Assume Alice and Bob follow the steps of
Protocol 8. Then Alice always accepts the output and the
outcome density operator is correct.
Proof. First we note that it is always possible to choose
measurement patterns MP by Lemma 2 and Mreduce by
Lemma 1. Further, by the universality of the Raussendorf
et al. encoding, it is always possible to choose Mcomp. As
the measurements composing MP , Mreduce, MP , and MA
are composed entirely of Pauli basis measurements, there
is no partial time ordering imposed on the sequence of
measurements and so the times at which these measurements
are made have no effect on the outcome of the protocol. Thus,
for any honest run of the protocol, the result will be the
same as if the measurements from MP were made first. By
construction this measurement pattern splits the graph state
into three separate graph states ˜KN .
The dummy qubits in MP and MA correspond to break
operations in their respective graphs by Lemma 4 and hence
after the initial step all the trap qubits remain unentangled
from the rest. Recall that for these trap qubits φi = 0 and
since the qubit is prepared in the state |+θi 〉 and measured in
basis {|+θi 〉,|−θi 〉}, the measurement result communicated to
Alice is si = ri for all such qubits. Thus, Alice always accepts,
satisfying the first criterion.
By definition Mreduce transforms the graph state corre-
sponding to ˜KN to the resource state necessary to implement
Mcomp. Finally, measuring according to Mcomp yields the
correct output of C by the correctness of the Raussendorf et al.
protocol. 
Theorem 11. Protocol 8 is blind while leaking at
most N .
Proof. The proof is directly obtained from Theorem 4. 
Protocol 7. Measurement pattern choice.
In what follows, choosing a measurement pattern means fixing the underlying graph state together with the appropriate angles of computation such
that the resulting pattern implements the desired computation due to universality. Similarly choosing a partial measurement pattern means fixing the
underlying graph state together with a partial set of angles of computation corresponding to a partial computation, where the rest of the angles will
be fixed in Protocol 8 where this protocol is called as a subroutine. Here we assume that a standard labeling of the vertices of each dotted-complete
graph state is known to both Alice and Bob.
(1) Alice chooses security parameter d and then transforms the quantum circuit C corresponding to her desired computation into (or directly
designs) a measurement patternMcomp on a graph state GL that implements her computation using the encoding for topological fault-tolerant
measurement-based quantum computation due to Raussendorf et al. [41], where GL is taken to correspond to the graph state of the three-
dimensional lattice L introduced in [41] with sufficient dimensions Dx , Dy , and Dz to implement her computation using an encoding with
parameters as follows: defect thickness d , lattice scale parameter λ = 5d , distillation of resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉 using L = log3(d)
levels, and for each concatenation level 1 <  < L the thickness parameter and scale parameter for that level are chosen as d = 3d−1 and
λ = λ−1, with d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d , and λL = λ.
(2) Alice chooses a partial measurement patternMreduce that reduces the graph state ˜KN to the graph state GL through Pauli measurements
(Theorem 6), where N is the total number of qubits in L.
(3) Alice chooses a partial measurement patternMP on the graph state ˜KN such that every qubit corresponding to a vertex in A( ˜KN ) is set to be a
dummy qubit. Hence all vertices in P ( ˜KN ) are isolated traps.
(4) Alice chooses a partial measurement patternMA on the graph state ˜KN such that every qubit corresponding to a vertex in P ( ˜KN ) is set to be a
dummy qubit. Hence all vertices in A( ˜KN ) are isolated traps.
(5) For the graph ˜K3N , Alice chooses uniformly at random a partitioning P of the vertices into three equal-size sets of vertices P1, P2, and P3.
(6) Alice takesMP to be the partial measurement pattern where the required vertices in A( ˜K3N ) are set to be dummy qubits such that the resulting
state is the tensor product of three graph states of the three disconnected graphs ˜k1 = ˜KN , ˜k2 = ˜KN , and ˜k3 = ˜KN such that P ( ˜ki) = Pi .
(7) Alice calculatesM, her overall measurement pattern on a graph state corresponding to ˜K3N , by combining the partial patternMP withMcomp
andMreduce applied to subgraph ˜k1 andMP andMA applied to subgraphs ˜k2 and ˜k3, respectively, to obtain a full measurement pattern.
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Protocol 8. Verifiable universal blind quantum computation.
(1) Alice’s resources
(i) Alice chooses the patternM and random partitioning P according to Protocol 7.
(ii) The dummy qubits position, set D, chosen according to Protocol 7.
(iii) A sequence of measurement angles φ = (φi)1i3N (3N+1)/2, with φi ∈ A, according to the description of Protocol 7, where φi = 0 for all
the trap and dummy qubits. The ordering of the measurements on P ( ˜K3N ) is chosen uniformly at random subject to the constraint that the
partial ordering of measurements fromMcomp determined by flow is preserved. Such a random ordering is required to hide the position of
the trap qubits. The qubits in A( ˜K3N ) are measured first in the order that the relevant edge entry appears in the adjacency matrix of K3N once
this random ordering has been taken into account. That is, the site in A( ˜K3N ) that is joined by edges to i and j in P ( ˜K3N ), with i < j in the
random ordering imposed on P ( ˜K3N ), is measured in position 3N(i − 1) + j − i(i+1)2 . Note that the measurement order of the vertices in A
should be independent of the computation (and traps), so in the above we prescribe one such suitable sequence. This is followed by the
measurements of P ( ˜K3N ) in the randomly chosen order.
(iv) 3N(3N + 1)/2 random variables θi with value taken uniformly at random from A.
(v) 3N(3N + 1)/2 random variables ri and |D| random variable di with values taken uniformly at random from {0,1}.
(vi) A fixed function C(i,φi,θi ,ri ,s) that for each nonoutput qubit i computes the angle of the measurement of qubit i to be sent to Bob.
(2) Initial step
(i) Alice’s move: Alice sets all the value in s to be 0 and prepares the qubits in the form
|di〉∀i ∈ D,∏
j∈NG(i)∩D
Zdj |+θi 〉∀i ∈ D
and sends Bob all the 3N(3N + 1)/2 qubits in the order of the labeling of the vertices of the graph.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob receives 3N(3N + 1)/2 single qubits and entangles them according to ˜K3N .
(3) Step i: 1  i  3N(3N + 1)/2
(i) Alice’s move: Alice computes the angle δi = C(i,φi,θi ,ri ,s) and sends it to Bob.
(ii) Bob’s move: Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the result bi .
(iii) Alice’s move: Alice sets the value of si in s to be si + ri .
(4) Verification
Alice accepts if si = ri for all the white and black trap qubits i.
In order to prove the verification property, as stated in
Theorem 9, we require that the measurement pattern is encoded
in such a way that any Pauli error of weight less than d will be
either corrected or detected. We now show that this is true for
the Raussendorf et al. scheme; although this is already implicit
in their paper [41], we make it explicit here for completeness.
In what follows we take L to be the three-dimensional lattice
corresponding to the resource state used in [41].
Lemma 5. Let MC be a measurement pattern that imple-
ments a computation C on GL, the graph state corresponding
to the lattice L, using the Raussendorf et al. fault-tolerance
scheme with the following parameters: defect thickness d, lat-
tice scale parameter λ = 5d, distillation of resource states |A〉
and |Y 〉 usingL = log3(d) levels, and for each concatenation
level 1 <  < L the thickness parameter and scale parameter
for that level are chosen as d = 3d−1 and λ = 3λ−1, with
d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d, and λL = λ. Take σ = {σ i} to be
a set of Pauli operators such that each σ i ∈ {I,X,Y,Z} and
acts on qubit i. Then for any σ , if MC is implemented on
state |GL〉, but the output of each measurement result or
unmeasured qubit i is modified by applying σ i , then either
the computation is correct (corresponding to a run where all
σ i = I ) or an error is detected when the output is decoded,
unless |BL| + |CL| + |DOL |  2d, where BL = {γ : σγ = X},
CL = {γ : σγ = Y }, and DOL = {γ : σγ = Z, γ ∈ O} and
where O is the set of output (unmeasured) qubits.
Proof. In the Raussendorf et al. scheme, logical qubits
are topologically protected against errors. The two lowest
weight topological errors are error cycles around defects
and error chains running between defects. As defects have
thickness d, any cross section forms a rectangle of dimension
at least d×d and thus perimeter at least 4(d + 1). As an
error cycle must fit around the remaining defect and the
minimum error cycle is at least 4d. As the centers of
defects are separated by distance λ, the minimum distance
between defects is λ − d and hence for our parameters we
have λ − d = 4d.
The only region where this topological protection breaks
down is within the regions used to distill the resource states |A〉
and |Y 〉. This distillation is performed using a concatenation
of L levels of the Reed-Muller (|A〉) or Steane (|Y 〉) codes.
Each level  of distillation is topologically protected with
parameters d and λ. As the Reed-Muller and Steane codes
are both distance 3, an error at level  can be caused by either
a topological error at that level or not less than three errors
at the previous level. However, since at each level  < L
we have λ − d = 4d and d = 3d−1, the minimum weight
w to create an error at level  is min(4d,8d−1,4d−1 +
w−1,3w−1). The four terms in this last expression account,
respectively, for the minimum weight errors in each of the four
possible cases: (1) The error is entirely topological at level ,
(2) the error is entirely topological at level  − 1, (3) the error
includes both topological errors at level  − 1 (which in the
worst case affects two qubits with a single weight 4d error
chain) and inherited errors from level  − 2, and (4) the case
where all errors are inherited from level  − 2.
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We then prove that w > 2d by induction, as follows.
Assume that at level i we have wi > 2di . In that case we have
wi+1 = min(4di+1,6di), since by assumption 4di + wi > 6di
and 3wi > 6di , and clearly 8di > 6di . However, we have
di+1 = 3di for all levels except the top level, where dL 
3dL−1. Thus, in general, 2di+1  6di and hence wi+1 > 2di+1.
At the lowest level the error distillation uses unencoded qubits
measured in non-Pauli bases and so w0 = 1 and w1 = 3 >
2d1 = 2 and thus by induction on i we obtain the result that
wL > 2d as required.
Note, however, that any operation on a measured qubit that
is diagonal in the computational basis (σ i ∈ {I,Z}) does not
alter the computation. Hence an undetectable logical error is
not created unless the total number of measured sites for which
σ i ∈ {X,Y } plus the total number of output qubits for which
σ i ∈ {X,Y,Z} is equal to or greater than 2d. Thus the outcome
is either correct or when decoded results in a detected error,
unless |BL| + |CL| + |DOL |  2d. 
Now we link the above general property of the Raussendorf
et al. scheme to our specific protocol. To do so, we first
introduce the notion of independently detectable errors.
Definition 11. Given a dotted-complete graph state ˜KN , a set
of output qubits O, a measurement pattern Mtarget containing
only X-Y plane measurements and Z basis measurements,
and a set of single-qubit Pauli operators σ = {σ i}Ni=1, with
σ i ∈ {I,X,Y,Z}, which represent errors that modify each
measurement result or unmeasured output qubit i by the
application of σ i , for each location i we define the set i = {i}
for i ∈ P ( ˜KN ) and i = N ˜KN (i) for i ∈ A( ˜KN ). We say that σ
contains k independently detectable errors if and only if there
exists a set E of k locations such that for all i ∈ E , σ i ∈ {X,Y }
if i /∈ O or σ i ∈ {X,Y,Z} if i ∈ O, and i ∩ j = 0 for all pairs
i,j ∈ E .
The intuition behind this definition is that in Protocol 8
the qubits in P ( ˜K3N ) are independently randomly distributed
between the two trap graphs and the computation graph and
whether or not a qubit inA( ˜K3N ) coincides with a trap depends
only on the placement of the neighboring qubits [which are
both in P ( ˜K3N )]. The first condition ensures that the error
anticommutes with some possible measurement of the system
and is hence truly an error, while the second condition ensures
that we are considering only qubits associated with disjoint
subsets of P ( ˜K3N ) and hence whether or not they coincide
with a trap is uncorrelated. With this definition in place, we
can proceed with proving a corollary to Lemma 5 that links
that result with Protocol 8.
Corollary 2. Let MC be a measurement pattern that
implements a computation C on graph state GL of N vertices
using the Raussendorf et al. scheme with parameters defect
thickness d, lattice scale parameter λ = 5d, distillation of
resource states |A〉 and |Y 〉 using L = log3(d) levels, and for
each concatenation level 1 <  < L the thickness parameter
and scale parameter for that level are chosen as d = 3d−1
and λ = λ−1, with d1 = 1, λ1 = 5, dL = d, and λL = λ.
Further, letMreduce be a partial measurement pattern consisting
of Pauli Z and Pauli Y measurements on qubits corresponding
to the vertices in A( ˜KN ) that reduces ˜KN to GL up to local
Z rotations. Let M be the measurement pattern for graph
state ˜KN produced by applying the partial pattern Mreduce
to the qubits corresponding to vertices in A( ˜KN ) and MC
(with appropriate local Z rotations applied) to the qubits
corresponding to vertices in P ( ˜KN ).
Take σ = {σ i} to be a set of single-qubit Pauli operators
such that each σ i ∈ {I,X,Y,Z} acts on qubit i. Then for any σ ,
ifMC is implemented on state ˜KN , but the output of each mea-
surement result or unmeasured qubit is modified by applying
σ i , then either the computation is correct (corresponding to a
run where all σ i = I ) or an error is detected when the output
is decoded, unless σ contains at least  2d5  independently
detectable errors.
Proof. First we note that only qubits in P ( ˜K3N ) are
contained in O, since all qubits in A( ˜K3N ) will be measured
to make the required resource states. All measurements on
qubits associated with vertices A( ˜KN ) are in either the Y or
Z basis, allowing any error in the measurement outcome to
be associated with an X error on the underlying qubit. As the
generators for the stabilizer of ˜KN are simply the operators
Xi
∏
j∈N
˜KN (i)
Zj and each vertex in A( ˜KN ) has only two
neighbors, both of which lie in P ( ˜KN ), an X error on a qubit
associated with a vertex in A( ˜KN ) is equivalent to a local error
on each of two qubits in P ( ˜KN ). Thus any local Pauli operator
in σ i associated with a vertex in A( ˜KN ) either can be replaced
by at most two local operators acting on qubits associated
with vertices in P ( ˜KN ) without altering the outcome of
the computation or has no effect on the computation. Note
that since Pauli Z operators always commute with Z basis
measurements and anticommute with any measurement in the
X-Y plane, these local operators are always Pauli operators
due to the corresponding restriction on Mtarget.
The only Pauli terms that can affect the outcome of the
computation are those that either flip a measurement outcome
(X orY ) or act nontrivially upon an unmeasured qubit (as either
X, Y , or Z). By Lemma 5, the outcome of the computation
is unaltered unless σ produces such errors on at least 2d
sites. To show that this implies the existence of at least  2d5 
independently detectable errors we will consider the effects of
errors on A( ˜KN ) and P ( ˜KN ) in relation to the resource state
for the Raussendorf et al. scheme GL. Errors on A( ˜KN ) only
occur when the qubit in question is measured in the Y basis,
since for Z basis measurements dummy qubits are used and
the outcome of Bob’s measurement is ignored. Thus, as we
have shown above, such errors correspond to local Pauli errors
at either end of an edge in the GL. Errors in P ( ˜KN ), however,
correspond simply to errors on single vertices inGL. Therefore,
we can consider any error introduced by σ as corresponding to
a subgraph gσ of GL, where i ∈ A( ˜KN ) introduces the vertices
in N ˜KN (i) together with a connecting edge, while i ∈ P ( ˜KN )
simply introduces the vertex i. Such a subgraph contains all of
the qubits in GL that can possibly be affected by local errors
after the measurement of qubits according toMreduce are taken
into account [propagating errors from A( ˜KN ) to P ( ˜KN )].
We note that any connected subgraph gγσ of gσ containing
nγ vertices necessarily contains at least nγ − 1 edges. Note
also that GL is four-edge colorable (see Fig. 10). Thus, by
the pigeonhole principle, there is at least one color for that
subgraph that corresponds to at least  nγ −14  edges. As the
various subgraphs gγσ are disconnected, we are free to choose
the coloring independently for each and hence can choose
a single four-edge coloring for gσ such that it includes at
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FIG. 10. Unit cell for the lattice corresponding to the Raussendorf
et al. scheme GL complete with one choice of four-edge coloring.
least  nγ −14  edges from each subgraph. We then take the
set E to correspond to qubits in A( ˜KN ) corresponding to
edges of this color, as well as to the single vertex in any
g
γ
σ for which nγ = 1, hence i ∩ j = 0. By Lemma 5, this
ensures that either the outcome of the computation is correct
or an error is detected upon decoding, or σ contains at least∑
γ :nγ2
nγ −1
4  +
∑
γ :nγ =1 1 independently detectable errors,
where
∑
γ nγ  2d. Note that∑
γ :nγ2
⌈
nγ − 1
4
⌉
+
∑
γ :nγ =1
1  2d
5
and hence either the computation is correct or an error
is detected upon decoding, or σ contains at least  2d5 
independently detectable errors. 
The above corollary guarantees that one of the conditions
of Theorem 9 for the verification with the amplified security is
satisfied. However, we cannot yet directly use that theorem
since, as stated before, the positions of the traps are not
completely random as the positions of the black traps are fixed
once we choose the random position assignment of qubits in
P ( ˜K3N ) to each of the three subgraphs. This is why we have
introduced the notion of independently detectable errors. Here
we give a direct proof of verification for Protocol 8 following
the same steps as the proof of Theorem 9.
Theorem 12. Protocol 8 is in general (5/6)2d/5 verifiable
and in the case of only classical output is (2/3)2d/5 verifiable,
where d is the security parameter as described in Protocol 7.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows the same strategy
as Theorem 8, first taking the most general strategy for Bob,
expanding this in terms of Pauli operators, and finally showing
that any Pauli term that leads to an incorrect outcome is
detected with high probability. We note that any deviation
by Bob from Protocol 8 can be rewritten in the form shown
in Fig. 7. The proof of this is identical to the corresponding
step in the proof of Theorem 8: Without loss of generality,
any deviation by Bob from the protocol can be written in
the form of Fig. 6. We can treat {δi} as inputs to the circuit
without violating causality, as they do not interact with any
other part of the computation until after bj has been measured,
for all j < i. Then simply by reordering the operators via their
commutation relations we obtain the form in Fig. 7 as required.
As a result, any deviation by Bob can be written as a single
deviation operator  that acts upon the quantum states Bob
receives from Alice as well as δi and some private register held
by Bob. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8 the probability of
Alice accepting an incorrect outcome density operator is then
pincorrect =
∑
ν
p(ν)Tr[P νincorrectBj (ν)]
=
∑
b,ν
p(ν)Tr(Pincorrect|b + cr〉〈b|CνC,b(P|	ν,b〉
× 〈	ν,b|P†)C†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
)
=
∑
k,b,i,j,ν
p(ν)αkiα∗kjTr
[
P⊥
(⊗
t∈T
∣∣ηνTt 〉〈ηνTt ∣∣
)
y
× |b + cr〉〈b|CνC,bσiP|	ν,b〉
× 〈	ν,b|P†σjC†νC,b|b〉〈b + cr |
]
,
where as in previous proofs we take the Kraus operators
associated with the , once Bob’s private system has been
removed, to be χk =
∑
i αkiσi , with
∑
k
∑
i αkiα
∗
ki = 1.
By Corollary 2, P⊥ projects out the terms in the above
sum where σi does not contain at least  2d5  independently
detectable errors on the computation graph. This is a somewhat
stronger condition than we actually need and so we will
consider terms corresponding to any σi that produces at least
 2d5  independently detectable errors in total across all three
subgraphs (the computation graph and the two trap graphs).
We will denote by I the set of all i for which σi does not
satisfy this condition. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8, all
terms for which i = j average to zero. Thus, as in the proof of
Theorem 9, we obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
∑
T
p(T )|αki |2
∏
t∈T
×
(∑
θt ,rt
p(θt )p(rt )
〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi∣∣ηνTt 〉2
)
.
As before, we introduce notional sets Sγ of three qubits each
such that exactly one qubit from each set is on each of the three
subgraphs (the two trap graphs and the computation graph)
and where either all of the qubits are in P ( ˜K3N ) or all of
the qubits are in A( ˜K3N ) (ensuring exactly one trap and at
least one dummy qubit per set). As every σi in the above sum
corresponds to at least  2d5  independently detectable (and
hence uncorrelated) errors across these sets Sγ , we have
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
×
⎛
⎝ ∑
tγ ,rtγ ,θtγ
p(tγ )p
(
rtγ
)
p
(
θtγ
)〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi∣∣ηνTt 〉2
⎞
⎠
=
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
⎛
⎝ ∑
tγ ,rtγ ,θtγ
1
48
〈
ηνTt
∣∣σi∣∣ηνTt 〉2
⎞
⎠,
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where as before tγ denotes the location of the trap qubit in set
Sγ . Averaging over all values of tγ , rtγ , and θtγ , we obtain
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
(
1 − wγ
6
)

∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
(
1 − 1
6
)wγ
=
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
(
5
6
)∑
γ wγ

∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
(
5
6
)2d/5

(
5
6
)2d/5
,
where wγ denotes the number of independently detectable
errors that fall within set Sγ . In the special case of all classical
output, however, the bound can be made tighter, since |ηνtγ 〉 =|rνtγ 〉, and hence
pincorrect 
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
Tr
⎛
⎝∑
tγ ,rtγ
1
6
〈
rνtγ
∣∣σi|t ∣∣rνtγ 〉2
⎞
⎠

∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
(
1 − wγ
3
)

∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
∏
γ
(
1 − 1
3
)wγ
=
∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
(
2
3
)∑
γ wγ

∑
k
∑
i /∈I
|αki |2
(
2
3
)2d/5

(
2
3
)2d/5
. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have extended the original universal blind quantum
computing protocol presented in [3] with different concepts of
blind preparation of isolated dummy qubits (a qubit prepared
randomly in the set {|0〉,|1〉}) and isolated trap qubits (a qubit
prepared randomly in the set {|+〉θ }). These two modifications
lead to a different construction for unconditionally verifiable
blind quantum computation. However, in this way only
polynomially bounded security could be achieved. Building
upon these ideas, combined with fault-tolerant computation,
we presented a UBQC protocol that achieves exponentially
bounded security for the verification scheme using a different
resource state, the dotted-complete graph state. This proto-
col extends the topological fault-tolerant measurement-based
quantum computation scheme due to Raussendorf et al. [41]
to a blind setting. We note that while consideration of fault
tolerance in the blind computation itself is beyond the scope of
the present work, if Protocol 8 is modified so as to allow Alice
to accept a finite error rate on the trap qubits, the probability
of Bob successfully cheating is exponentially suppressed in
the gap between the expected error weight inferred from trap
measurements and our threshold of  2d5  and so a fault-tolerant
adaptation of this protocol should be possible.
As mentioned before, a verifiable UBQC protocol can be
viewed as an interactive proof system where Alice acts as the
verifier and Bob as the prover [3–5]. This link to complexity
theory suggests a different approach to questions such as the
open problem of finding an interactive proof for any problem
in BQP with a BQP prover, but with a purely classical verifier.
The conceptual link between blindness and interactive proof
systems is the key ingredient for verifying the high-complexity
quantum-theoretic models with low-complexity classical ones.
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